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Abstract 
A Psychosocial Study of The Professional Recourse to The Adolescent Body in 
Education examines formulations of the adolescent body in the major social 
establishments of education, psychiatry, politics, and law. The dissertation shows how the 
discontentments of adolescent subjectivity are linked to biological irregularities 
understood as objective realities. Despite the growing challenges posed by this visions 
and the difficulties it presents which remain unsolved, the non-dynamic view of the 
adolescent body survives as a chief organizing medium for relations of care in social 
establishments. This imaginary of experience maintains a belief system wherein 
adolescent subjectivity is premised upon being explained with accuracy and legitimacy, 
largely without question, despite the actuality that this vision is not supported by relevant 
evidence. 
These messages provide a paradox that frames the central inquiry in this 
dissertation: The stresses and sorrows that express the spectrum of ordinary and 
exceptional adolescent subjectivity show the striking ways in which the adolescent body 
is the site for the enactment of confusion, conflict and pain.  
The following intervention involves a concurrent analysis that explores the 
tensions between five approaches—the educational, legal, medical, psychosocial and 
popular genesis of the dynamic of adolescent subjectivity. I characterize the significant 
difficulties that arise when the genesis of adolescent subjectivity is taken to be 
determined by the gesture of a non-dynamic adolescent body that internalizes causes in 
the body and externalizes the work of care and its provision. The tensions in these 
approaches are taken up through a series of case studies drawn from medical, legal, and 
literary sources.  Starting from a critique of the limitations that are inherent to the vision 
of the adolescent body as non-dynamic, throughout this dissertation I develop an 
alternative approach: Using case reasoning, I respond to these discourses, which still 
hinge on the phantasies embedded and persistent within institutional frameworks, by 
looking to the account of the adolescent body in psychosocial constructions that suggest 
that the difficulty of working with and responding to the disturbance in adolescence 
requires a shift in thinking about transition, transformation, and development. 
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Chapter 1: A Psychosocial Approach to the Rise of the Non-dynamic Body and its 
Implications in the Provision of Adolescent Development  
1.1. Introduction 
A Psychosocial Study of The Professional Recourse to The Adolescent Body in 
Education is a study on the status of the body in the provision of care for adolescents in 
contemporary social establishments where we find formulations of the adolescent body 
are constructed as nonsensuous, asocial, and impersonal. This dissertation looks at how 
this vision of the adolescent body is upheld in the major social establishments of 
education, psychiatry, politics, and law under the assumption that the discontents of 
adolescent subjectivity are linked to biological irregularities understood as objective 
realities. In the meantime, there is a growing number of scholars pointing out the 
supposition that mental distress is linked to biological rooted entities is not supported by a 
scientific credibility (Vanheule 2017, Frances 2016). There has been a noted trend in the 
progress of biomedical research and its recurrent failure to be translated into research in 
the distress and difficulties of subjectivity and the provision of care (Bryant 2006).  
These messages provide a paradox that frames the central inquiry in this 
dissertation: Why, despite the growing challenges posed by this vision and the difficulties 
it presents remain unsolved, the non-dynamic view of the adolescent body survives as a 
chief organizing medium for relations of care in social establishments. What are the 
consequences of this imagination? How can the imaginary of adolescent subjectivity 
ingrained in a nonsensual biological imaginary maintain a belief system wherein 
adolescent subjectivity largely without question, despite the actuality that this vision is 
not supported by relevant evidence? This paradox cannot be neglected and points to the 
heart of all professional action engaged with the provision of adolescent care. 
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This study is interested in the surge of formulations adolescents experience by 
way of constructions of the non-dynamic body. In what I term non-dynamic adolescent 
body I refer to a the impersonal, non-relational, asocial, and non-sensual constructions of 
the adolescent body upheld by practitioners involved in the provision of adolescent care 
that leans on a biological irregularity in the form of causality (Vanheule 2017). The non-
dynamic constructions of body cultivated through probabilistic and statistical styles of 
reasoning is where we find a range of non-dynamic measurements including blood tests, 
brain images, and the study of hormones, genes, and genitalia. This idea is bound 
together with another idea that the relational and contextual aspects of experience “(i.e., 
the life history, social circumstances, and cultural background)” is thought to play only a 
minor moderating role” in the expression and formation of subjectivity (Vanheule 2017, 
4).  
My study explores this paradox: Despite the powerful discourses through which 
the adolescent subjectivity is formulated, we find that it is common to speak of the 
adolescent body as a neutral term in educational theory, parental advice, risk analysis, 
clinical formulations, social policies and public decisions. Such diverse interests are 
organized by the non-dynamic adolescent body and lean upon a growing scholarship that 
most often generates descriptive research to provide correlational speculations rather than 
experimental designs on adolescent suffering. Why then have parental and educational 
anxieties and solutions, political responses, and popular accounts of contemporary 
adolescent experience been locked into formulations of a non-dynamic adolescent body? 
This dissertation investigates this paradox by engaging the means by which the provision 
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of care draws on the non-dynamic body to generate a causality that links the adolescent 
body to a response of care. 
Biology as non-dynamic formulations persuade—from genetic markers, to the 
brain, and hormones, this body evidence offers up serviceable descriptions of adolescent 
experience. Current formulations of problems in contemporary adolescent subjectivity are 
grounded in this rendering of the body as non-dynamic that hinges on statistical 
reasoning, which didn't fare scientifically well but captured the professional imaginary 
(Vanheule 2017). Biological formulations present simply and successfully as the way we 
should approach adolescent subjectivity, despite a growing critical discourse that notes 
the widening gap between the progress of biomedical research and its recurrent failure to 
be translated into research in diagnostics and psychotherapy (Cuthbert and Insel 2013). 
1.2. Definitions and research questions 
The shifts I trace through concepts, examples and situations of adolescence do not 
align and there will be moments of delay as I return to earlier events to provide situated 
updates on relevant material. This is for the purpose of animating the interdisciplinary 
tensions of the question of adolescent subjectivity that take place across clinical, 
schooling, legal, and political spheres. Still there are some larger shifts that draw the 
diverse rhythms and paces of these developments together. I intend to demonstrate an 
attention to the different timelines of these interdisciplinary shifts through a variety of 
concepts to ask pertinent questions that move beyond the systematic and engage with the 
changing picture of the adolescent body. 
A set of definitions is needed to qualify the terms that I use throughout this dissertation, 
beginning with ‘adolescence.’ Instead of associating adolescent experience with an age 
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designation, my use of the term adolescence or the adolescent follows current scholarship 
to bring together two distinct periods in the experience of schooling. The nature of 
secondary and higher education have extended the meaning of the term adolescent to 
include the stage of development referred to as the young-adult or emerging-adult. This 
has broadened the scope of the term adolescence, and yet I am fully conscious of the fact 
that most high school students—not to mention university students—would object 
passionately to the term adolescent. However, the subjects of high-school and higher-
education will be called adolescent to point out that my analysis of contemporary 
adolescent subjectivity is characterized by what Alison Gopnik (2009) has called the 
“protracted immaturity” made possible by social establishments (15).  
The second idea concerns  Kristeva’s notion of adolescent ideality. For Kristeva, 
adolescence is structured as ideality. Kristeva’s (2011) notion of ideality departs from the 
psychological emphasis on biology and instead explains adolescent subjectivity through 
the notion of ideality as a state of mind. Kristeva laid an emphasis on the dynamic tension 
in adolescence that derives from the developmental situation in which the adolescent is 
“caught between childhood, where needs and demands were met, and a world that now 
demands compliance” (Britzman in press). The adolescent meets these demands with a 
solution which is expressed as a question of belief that regulates the tensions between self 
and other, and inner and outer world, as adolescence marks the time where we find forms 
of idealism function as solutions to these tensions that contribute to the process of their 
regulation.  
Ideality takes various forms of belief that hover around the question of meaning 
“as a time of heightened creativity, as flexible and pliant, and as capable of rapid change 
 5 
of mind along with argumentation over the value of meaning” (Britzman, in press). 
Rather than a fact of belief, Kristeva deliberately qualifies the belief as an “incredible 
need” (Kristeva 2011, 11) which signals the relational character of ideality. Adam 
Phillips (2011) explains this dynamic as “essentially seeking and protecting highly valued 
ideals – whether these come in the form of self-images of masculinity and femininity, 
crushes and crazes, being a fan, or a recluse, or a show-off and so on – then the question 
becomes what are we doing, how can we who think of ourselves as helping adolescents in 
some way […] be used by them in this ongoing quest for ideals” (189). Kristeva’s notion 
of ideality carries a paradoxical dynamic and has guiding psychosocial suppositions for 
this study. While adolescent ideality appears as a non-relational, impersonal, and asocial 
form of experiences, it draws on intrapersonal and interpersonal dilemmas of subjectivity 
and this is implicated in the question of provision care as it gets caught up with ideality 
(Kristeva 2014, 12). This study demonstrates how ideality is embedded in the non-
dynamic formulations of adolescent subjectivity through the ways it poses severe 
challenges to the practises of medicine, law, and education. 
I discuss the ways that non-dynamic adolescent body is used in provision of care 
in social establishments in order to engage the particularity of formulations of adolescent 
experience found in institutions of care. I use the term ‘provision of care’ throughout this 
dissertation to refer to the professional ways of receiving, representing, and responding to 
adolescent subjectivity. These formulations, representations, and responses of care are 
akin to what Ian Hacking (2002) termed “law-like regularity” (36), and they refer to the 
different uses of the adolescent body that became the basis of public and political 
decisions, clinical judgements, popular accounts, and educational strategies after the 
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“operational revolution” in medical frameworks (Parnas and Povet 2015, 207). The 
operationalization of nosology marks the logic at work in the non-dynamic formulations 
of the adolescent body. Operationalization is the centrepiece of the transformation from 
descriptive approaches to what Hacking describes as probability as causality. Statistical 
inference as causality became the chief way of understanding, representing, and 
responding to adolescent subjectivity in chorus with the wider transformations in 
contemporary institutions of care. 
One of the critical points concerning the adolescent body as non-dynamic has to 
do with “the erosion of determinism” that Hacking ties to the scientific revolution in 
twentieth century physics that resulted in the replacement of causality with probability 
(2002, 1). This was a shift that paved the way for the emergence of indeterminacy in the 
ways subjectivity was conceptualized. The indeterminacy pertaining to subjectivity 
moved from “human nature” to “normalcy,” organized by statistical inference (1). 
My study seeks to address what the contemporary institutionalisation of the 
provision of adolescent care when  locked into the non-dynamic adolescent body means 
for adolescent subjectivity. This requires some context to understand the historical 
situation of mass schooling through which the new principles of psychological and social 
research formed. At the turn of the twentieth century a host of forces at play shaped the 
meaning of adolescent subjectivity and the question of how care should be undertaken 
(Freud [1905] 2017; Hall 1903, 1904, 1914; Britzman in press). As mass schooling was 
instituted, the adolescent became a permanent resident of the social establishment. 
Approaches to adolescent subjectivity and the provision of care were organized by causal 
explanations about development linked to the adolescent body. For 
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instance, recapitulation theory linked conflicts in adolescent subjectivity to derailment, or 
a lack of hygiene (Lesko 2012; Hall 1904).  As the indeterminacy of subjectivity was 
established in the twentieth century, adolescent subjectivity became a subject of study for 
psychological practice and the social sciences where the conflict in adolescent experience 
came to be rendered as the central dimension of subjectivity (Aichorn 1935; Blos 1966, 
Erikson 1968, Cohen [1972] 2011, Hebdige [1979] 1991; Willis 1981). In this approach 
the causality established at the turn of the century was offset by new approaches where 
adolescent subjectivity began to be studied with growing indeterminacy built in to its 
approaches. 
The past fifty years brought an echo of earlier shifts with the application of a new 
form of determinism in the provision of adolescent development, which paralleled wider 
cultural shifts that took place in education, psychiatry, and psychology. The space for 
studies on adolescent subjectivity, removed from moralistic and eugenic views of the 
stress and sorrows of adolescent subjectivity, was strikingly replaced by logical 
probability. This relied on statistical reasoning established by the transformations of care 
embodied by the 1980 “operational revolution” that marked the decision to reorganize the 
helping professions with an increased reliance on probability (Parnas and Bovet 2015, 
207). Subsequently this imaginary of care was upheld by social establishments of care 
and consequently the adolescent body appeared on the central stage in the explorations of 
subjectivity conducted by social establishments. Statistical reasoning became a powerful 
way to create concepts that could contain those aspects of subjectivity previously thought 
to be beyond understanding—what Hacking termed (2002) the “taming of chance.” In the 
case of the adolescent body the “taming of chance” requires closer attention because what 
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is critical in the emergence of the adolescent body as non-dynamic is predicated upon a 
paradox: while probability was at the heart of studies of adolescent subjectivity, the 
principle of probability led absolutism to be the cardinal way of understanding adolescent 
experience. This absolutism, paradoxically, a quality of adolescence as a state of mind 
can be found in what came to be known as the biomedical model and  the imagination of 
the non-dynamic adolescent body. 
In this dissertation I investigate the success of the construction and use of non-
dynamic adolescent body and its role in the provision of care in social establishments 
concerned with adolescent development. Statistical reasoning is appealing because it 
offers a systematic way to generate correlational representations of experience, such as 
adolescent truancy and socio-cultural status. The problem here is that statistical 
reasoning, which only provides correlational hypotheses, is now equated with causality. 
This is seen not only in the lay use of biomedical vocabulary but also in the discourses of 
research. With the emergence of systematic methods, diverse interests now hinge once 
again on the non-dynamic adolescent body. From these vocabularies, we see an 
imaginary at work in parental anxieties, educational concerns, political responses, and 
cultural idealizations of adolescent subjectivity. 
The chief problem we find in non-dynamic renderings of the adolescent body is 
that it is not clear whether they stem from observable evidence or from limits in thinking. 
Common explanations for these recourses lean on the idea that the reason suffering is 
being situated in a biological marker is because it is based on evidence that hinges on a 
neurobiological schema that “support[s] the belief in the biomedical illness assumption” 
(Vanheule 2014, 75). This evidence, as I argue in this dissertation, is more complicated 
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than it is presented to be and thus the self-evident explanation it proffers is not a 
satisfactory explanation for the prevalence of the utilization of the formulations that 
uphold the adolescent body as non-dynamic. 
The case of ADHD makes clear the definition of the non-dynamic adolescent 
body. The origins of ADHD go back to the beginning of compulsory education and the 
consensus—that in order to meet educational expectations—sustained attention and 
behavioural control were required. The first formulations of ADHD, hence, were 
organized around “excessive motor activity, impulsivity, and attention difficulty,” and in 
1902 ADHD was associated with neurological causality, understood to be a consequence 
of “minimal brain dysfunction” (El-Gabalawi 2014, 23). In the DSM II (American 
Psychiatric Association 1972) the diagnosis was termed “Hyperkinetic Syndrome” and 
with the DSM III (American Psychiatric Association 1980) we observe a major revision 
and a move towards attention with “Attention Deficit Disorder.” The subsequent revision 
combined the previous two under the new name “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder” (American Psychiatric Association 1987). The most recent edition, the DSM-
5—where the name remains the same— stumbles onto an inherent and inevitable blind 
spot in current conceptualizations of adolescent suffering (American Psychiatric 
Association 2014). The criteria was changed and the DSM now advises diagnosticians 
that ADHD symptoms should be observed prior to age twelve, a change from the 
previous criteria of age seven. Further, the DSM-5 newly classifies ADHD as a 
neurodevelopmental disorder. Thus we enter the crossroads of representation and 
response where the adolescent body is investigated in isolation to identify physiological 
change that is presented as causality. We must note that despite the ways ADHD is 
 10 
determined through leaps and language that infer a basis in experimental and biological 
disciplines, the investigative and diagnostic approaches to ADHD are in fact descriptive. 
When these changes in the institutional provision of adolescent care are analysed through 
a multi-layered analysis that considers clinical, legal, educational, and administrational 
concerns, this study maintains an observation that the studies of adolescence have 
developed a kinship of method and process with physiology, and investigates current 
implications of such imagination. 
Formulations of care present us with the idea that the cause of suffering is a 
“well-defined fixed internal structure that simply awaits scientific discovery” (El-
Gabalawi 2014, 81). My dissertation examines this conflict by engaging not only the 
dilemma of the looping effect—i.e. whether the response is also responsible for the 
current conflict—but also, my chief interest in this dissertation, which bears too on these 
formulations of suffering, is in the meaning of the recourse to the non-dynamic view of 
the adolescent body and its implications for both contemporary adolescent subjectivity 
and instituted care. Whether we are aware of the current crisis in contemporary social 
establishments regarding the provision of care, or whether we believe in the explanation 
that lays the emphasis of responsibility for adolescent experience on a biological marker, 
there is a high dependence on non-dynamic view of the stress and sorrows of adolescent 
subjectivity. 
1.3. On the division of the helping professions: A case of the non-dynamic adolescent 
body 
A controversy over a case of child and adolescent withdrawal provides me a 
pronounced occasion to illustrate my focus on the problematic found in the uses of the 
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adolescent body as non-dynamic and the implications that I analyse throughout this 
dissertation. In an issue of The New Yorker published April 3, 2017 Rachel Aviv (2017) 
wrote an investigative article on a newly emerged mental disturbance presenting as total 
apathy prevalent in children and adolescents of families seeking asylum in Sweden. The 
piece draws close attention to the case of a thirteen-year-old boy, Georgi, and his story of 
withdrawal from psychosocial life. Georgi’s symptoms confirm the central qualities of a 
severely withdrawn adolescent matching those found in the descriptions of journal or 
newspaper articles. His condition is perplexing as he is the most ‘Swedified’ member of 
the family, the family’s translator, and a successful and popular student in his class. 
Georgi’s family also carries the main qualities of the affected population. The family 
belongs to a pacifist religious sect from North Ossetia in Russia and their refugee 
application was turned down for insufficient evidence of danger awaiting the family back 
in Russia. Having lived six years undocumented in Sweden, Georgi was thirteen when he 
read the decision to reject his family’s appeal. Upon reading the rejection letter, a letter of 
deportation, Georgi fell ill presenting qualities of a severe and coma-like withdrawal: 
“dependent on tube-feeding”, with “no reaction to caregiving” (70). 
In early 2000, a coma-like state of withdrawal was observed in critical number of 
children and adolescents between the ages of eight and fifteen. To give a picture of this 
condition we can refer to a Swedish paediatrician and analyst Göran Bodegård (2005a) 
who describes these children as “totally passive, immobile, lack[ing] tonus, withdrawn, 
mute, unable to eat and drink, incontinent and not reacting to physical stimuli or pain” 
(1706). Initially, the phenomenon of withdrawal presented as an exceptional occurrence, 
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but was swiftly elevated to the status of ‘epidemic’ with a sudden increase in cases 
observed in children and adolescents. 
Children who fell into the conditions of this ‘epidemic’ presented in a catatonic 
state. Either before hearing a decision by the immigration board on their family’s refugee 
claim or upon hearing a negative decision, these children showed classical signs of 
withdrawal: refusing to go to school, ceasing interaction with family members, and 
stopping eating and talking altogether (Bodegård 2005a; Hacking 2010). The severity of 
these withdrawals caused manifold fractures among popular opinion, medical doctors, 
paediatricians, politicians, and psychiatrists, all of whom argued over issues of 
development, ailment, and security (Hacking 2010; Sallin et al. 2016). 
Between 2003 and 2005, there were over 424 cases reported of children and 
adolescents falling into this severe state of withdrawal (Sallin et al. 2016, 2). While 
academics, politicians, and doctors have taken up this ‘epidemic’, there has been no 
satisfying explanation as to what these adolescents and children suffer from beyond the 
fact common among the cases that they fall into this condition while their families are 
applying for permanent residency from Sweden. Another peculiar feature of this 
condition is that it is found exclusively in Sweden among undocumented children and 
adolescents. Ten years after its first baffling occurrence, it is increasingly understood less 
as an epidemic and more as endemic. “As of today”, write Sallin and her colleagues in 
2016, noting tens of new cases reported, “diagnostic criteria are undetermined, 
pathogenesis uncertain and the regional distribution unexplained” (Sallin et al. 2016, 2). 
In popular opinion, the endemic condition received various responses that 
explained the condition as an occurrence emanating from factors exclusively external to 
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Sweden. While public responses tended to remain within the ‘politically correct’ zone, 
they led, at times, to an “anti-immigrant disposition” (Hacking 2010, 309). Public opinion 
speculated upon the possibility that these children and adolescents “were faking it, or 
perhaps being drugged by their parents” (309). This disposition persisted not only 
because of the enigmatic appearance of the symptoms but also because of their 
astonishing disappearance. While sometimes, full recovery took much longer, even 
leaving permanent damage, the children and adolescents with moderate withdrawal were 
found to have recovered within a few days of the family being granted permanent 
residence. 
Political accounts laid an emphasis on culture. It was argued, for instance, that the 
countries these families were coming from hosted a “holistic” child-rearing approach and 
this is what led to the withdrawal (Aviv 2017, 71). In psychiatric accounts the 
designations used to describe the condition were several: “Depressive Devitalization 
Syndrome,” “Pervasive Refusal Syndrome” (Bodegård 2005a, 337), “Resignation 
Syndrome” (Sallin et al. 2016, 1), “Dissociative Stupor, [...] Asylum-seeking children 
with severe loss of activities of daily living” (Söndergaardet et al. 2002, 2), and more 
speculatively as “voodoo death” (Aviv 2017, 75). The Swedish Association for Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry came forward stating that they were without the means to treat this 
illness as the problem stemmed from the political failure to accommodate this population, 
while another paediatrician blamed his colleagues for their “resistance to look into the 
brain and acknowledge that there is a biological system at work” (Aviv 2017, 75). Some 
noted that children experienced “intolerable and traumatizing situations in their home 
countries” and noted the possibility of the children being re-traumatized because of the 
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experience of seeking asylum (Bodegård 2005, 338). Suggestions went as far as to imply 
a need to test the children’s blood to check if their parents had drugged them for the 
purposes of immigration (Hacking 2010). 
The inexplicable nature of the ‘epidemic’ divided the helping professions 
responding to its pervasive occurrences. Psychologists, psychiatrists, paediatricians, and 
sociologists developed hostility towards one another in the process. “Sociologists are 
accused of complete failure of compassion for taking a heartless collective view of the 
phenomenon”, writes Ian Hacking (2010), “while doctors are accused of encouraging, if 
not engendering the phenomenon by sensationalising it” (310). Also divided was popular 
opinion on the matter. As the bafflement around this epidemic was understood more in 
terms of being endemic to Sweden, it led to suspicion toward the Swedish immigration 
and refugee system. Then the discourse took the opposite form. In 2005, two large 
Swedish national daily papers fell back on a familiar cry: “This is not a real sickness after 
all! It is straightforward malingering. Or maybe worse—the mothers are drugging the 
children” (Hacking 2010, 313). 
The Swedish government appointed a team of researchers to look into the nature 
of this ‘epidemic’ in 2005 to prepare a report by 2007. The children and adolescents who 
fell into this condition, with some exceptions, were exclusively from former Soviet 
(Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan) and former Yugoslavian (Serbia, Kosovo) states. The 
government’s investigation into the ‘epidemic’ involved field trips to these countries. The 
trips were meant to investigate the cause for such occurrences. Research was carried out 
with UN agencies, nurses, psychiatrists and public authorities; they found no indication 
regarding the existence of this cultural manifestation. The committee's views on the issue 
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were at odds with the Stockholm paediatric advocacy group which emphasised the 
urgency of diagnosis to increase the probability of receiving permanent residence. In their 
estimation, this was the only cure for the withdrawal. 
Swedish law also upheld the blurry picture of response to this severe condition. 
According to Swedish law, while children are not deported to war regions, being from 
these Soviet and Yugoslavian regions corresponded to a blind spot created by the recent 
change in Swedish law that limited the acceptance of refugee claims to those coming 
from countries with active war (Aviv 2016). This meant, because of an absence of active 
war in the last decade in these countries, families who sought refuge in Sweden had a 
difficult time proving the danger awaiting them in their countries of origin. 
Georgi’s situation follows a similar path. After a burning controversy over 
Georgi’s condition his family is granted permanent residency. The efforts to help Georgi 
“absorb the news” illustrate another astonishing quality of this peculiar condition (76). 
With Georgi, Aviv describes how “for two weeks” this process of absorption endured: 
Georgi’s brother, parents, and friends tried to get him to absorb the good news. 
His family took him in his wheelchair to an ice-skating rink, where his classmates 
were playing hockey, but the fresh air had little noticeable effect. ‘You have got 
the positive!’ one of his friends kept shouting. ‘We tried to show him that our 
mood had changed.’ (76) 
In efforts to formulate a response of care to this particular adolescent we come 
across the familiar urge in contemporary frameworks to equate evidence with care. 
Ambiguity is perceived as the obstacle. The boundaries between what is psychological 
and what is biological, what is political and what is sociological, what is genuine 
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suffering and what is fake, what is inside and what is outside, what is cultural and what is 
universal are difficult to maintain. Each attempt that failed to maintain these boundaries 
had a direct consequence on the question of what counts as evidence of care. 
The stakes I have highlighted here constitute some of the central dilemmas that 
non-dynamic formulations of the adolescent body carry: Does the response create the 
problem? Or, does the question of response reside within the problem?  What do 
adolescents suffer from? To what extent is the experience of response related to the 
experience of suffering? The case of children and adolescents with severe withdrawal 
also illustrates a central dimension of the discussion. Why has the search for an 
internalized cause, a search that ranges from testing blood, to mapping genetics and 
imaging the brain, become the predominant way of receiving, representing, and 
responding to adolescent subjectivity? 
1.4. Method: Psychosocial case reasoning 
The methodological approach in this study is primarily psychosocial in that “case 
reasoning” has been placed at the centre of the analysis (Forrester 2016, 2). In his study 
Thinking in Cases, John Forrester develops a conceptual tool he calls “case reasoning” 
(2). In the study, The Taming of Chance Hacking had employed the term “style of 
reasoning” to refer to six distinct styles of reasoning in science: “a) the simple postulation 
and deduction, b) experimental exploration, c) hypothetical construction of models by 
analogy, d) ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy, e) statistical analysis of 
regularities of populations, and f) historical derivation of genetic development” (2002, 6). 
Forrester suggests that case reasoning should be added to these styles of reasoning as 
“‘thinking in cases’ [is] another style of reasoning, in which individual cases served as 
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exemplars with scientific and legal thought” (Evans 2017, 8-9). Within these styles of 
reasoning, “thinking in cases” to investigate the meanings and implications of the 
adolescent body as non-dynamic allows me to carry out two concurrent inquiries. 
First, the psychosocial style of reasoning allows my inquiry to investigate how the 
non-dynamic adolescent body gained centrality in the provision of care by looking at the 
network of social relations that the exemplar is intrinsically a part of, a network Kuhn 
termed the “disciplinary matrix” (2012, 182). The second reason turns to the ethical, 
educational, and clinical implications of the adolescent body both for the adolescent and 
for the caregiver in the contemporary social establishments. 
Before explaining in further detail these two main reasons that psychosocial 
reasoning structures my methodology, I turn to The Taming of Chance where Hacking 
(2002) draws on a shift I introduced earlier as statistical reasoning thought to situate 
psychosocial reasoning. To understand this of style reasoning it is helpful to revisit the 
ways thinking was changed in the social sciences through new methodologies. The 
revolutionary character of statistical reasoning lay in its capacity to overthrow causality 
in the social sciences. Unlike the determinism that generated causal accounts of human 
nature (and relied on the accepted fact that history rather than any degree of chance 
determined the present), the indeterminism which emerged meant that “social and 
personal laws were to be a matter of probabilities” (Hacking 2002, 2). Probability was 
meant to address indeterminism which had hosted the possibility of a science with 
subjectivity as it seemed to promise subjectivity liberated from the confines of 
causality.  But as the statistical style of reasoning became central, probability—initially 
linked to the indeterminacy—now became a new form of determinacy as it was applied to 
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human psychology. Measurements supplanted subjective experiences. And, as Hacking 
notes, “with the erosion of determinism:” 
Society became statistical. A new type of law came into being, analogous to the 
laws of human nature, but pertaining to people. These new laws were expressed in 
terms of probability. They carried with them the connotations of normalcy and 
deviations from the norm. (2002, 1) 
The adolescent body as non-dynamic followed this larger shift and the provision care in 
adolescent development was increasingly linked to self-authenticating accounts of “social 
and behavioural sciences, with consequences for the concept of causality in the natural 
sciences” (Hacking 2002, 7). 
The statistical reasoning driven approach claims that what cases reveal hardly 
goes beyond reference to the exceptional and therefore can be either explicitly or 
implicitly dismissed (Vanheule 2017). The emergence of statistical inference as the chief 
mode of response to subjectivity in the helping professions had two central by-products. 
The first consequence that I will elaborate throughout this dissertation is that the 
replacement of indeterminacy with statistical reasoning led to an unexpected consequence 
whereby the helping professions lost a central quality, namely, the “possibility of a 
science of the individual” (Forrester 2016, 10). In Thinking in Cases John Forrester 
(2016) noted that the human sciences are not organized “around the attainment of 
generalizable laws”, but rather on “infinitely various individuals, or cases” (13). 
Psychology, Law, and Medicine, among other sciences, are built on case studies. “It is 
the individuality of the patient” writes Forrester, that “in a sense, grants the word 
‘clinical’ its meaning” (128). Forrester reminds us that what is lost in the ascendancy of 
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bodily formulations is the subjective and intersubjective quality because “when people 
talk about clinical medicine they usually mean medicine in its direct relationship to the 
patient” (127). 
I employ case reasoning in this dissertation for its capacity to highlight what 
Kuhn (2012) called, the exemplar when he revised his concept of the paradigm—which 
back then was mostly overstretched and quickly came to mean anything that scientists 
agreed upon rather than its initial meaning of a certain agreement over practise. Exemplar 
refers to the ways that a solution is generated in a professional practice. Exemplar 
provides my study a unique occasion as it situates an individual professional’s dilemmas 
over generating a response within a professional network as the exemplar refers to 
successful shared examples that guide professional encounters with the uncertainty of the 
limit (Forrester, 46). The exemplar serves further significance because it illustrates the 
addition of the “disciplinary matrix” which Kuhn later made in his revisions to describe 
the relational quality of shared examples. Kuhn (2012) employed the disciplinary matrix 
to “characterize the network of social relations in which the production and employment 
of social scientific knowledge are embedded” (7). 
The second reason for employing psychosocial case reasoning in this inquiry lies 
in its capacity to highlight the implications of the provision of adolescent care generated 
through the non-dynamic adolescent body both for the subjects of care and for the 
caregiver. Among many implications, investigating the recourses to the non-dynamic 
adolescent body has ethical, educational, clinical, and legal implications. Here, I join 
Hacking (2002) to address the ethical questions at stake in the conceptions of the non-
dynamic adolescent body because, while probability gained through the statistical 
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approach, it cannot be the basis of ethics to “dictate values,” thus this approach “lies at 
the basis of all reasonable choice made by officials” (4). The non-dynamic adolescent 
body, as I show in each chapter has become the organizing principle for public and legal 
decision-making and educational intervention. By covering relationality with a veneer of 
objectivity that surfaces in different terms such as critical detachment or the best interest 
of the adolescent, the question of how to care for adolescents is replaced by claims of 
objectivity embedded in formulations of the adolescent body. 
Case reasoning brings us back to the importance of subjectivity—not only the 
subjectivity of the adolescent but also of the professional. For the clinician, parent, 
educator or legal professional involved with the provision of adolescent development, the 
status of subjectivity is integral to the provision of care. It is because the subjectivity of 
the caregiver has been rendered irrelevant, as the logic of statistical inference has 
harvested the imaginary, that the question of care and suffering hinges on the way the 
caregiver’s subjectivity is detached from it. 
This lack of qualification that saturates the care relation emanates from the law-
like probability of statistical reasoning dictates ethical measure (Hacking 2002). 
Psychosocial case reasoning reopens this research question of the merits of qualification 
of unique human experience on a case by case basis. “Equity”, Forrester (2006) writes, 
“ever since Aristotle, has been concerned not with principles, but with addressing 
features of cases that cannot be governed by rules alone. Equity is about doing justice to 
the individual case, [….] Case law actually operates by connecting case to case in a more 
direct way. You don’t need to pass via generality” (128-9).  Drawing from these 
arguments, in my analysis of adolescent subjectivity as received, represented, and in 
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response, and with close connection to the non-dynamic adolescent body, I pay particular 
attention to the way that psychologists, psychoanalysts, epidemiologists, educators, and 
legal professionals use the adolescent body in their formulations of care. 
The works of Darian Leader (2011; 2016), D.W. Winnicott (2012a; 2012b; 
2012c), Deborah Britzman (2006; 2009; 2012; 2013; 2015), Julia Kristeva (2011; 2012), 
Erving Goffman (1961; 1963), and John Forrester (2016) are central in guiding my 
approach to analyse a) how the non-dynamic adolescent body was constructed through 
styles of reasoning; b) how the style of reasoning influenced law, education, and the 
clinic directly and indirectly; and c) how these styles of reasoning affected the subjects of 
care and the professionals charged with that care. In analysing this interplay that Hacking 
(1998) called “looping effects”, my larger goal is to situate the emergence of the non-
dynamic adolescent body as the by-product of a larger transformation in contemporary 
social establishments (21). Working with the ways this particular formulation of the 
adolescent body is used to define, represent, and respond to adolescent experience, I try 
to show “the consequences for the way in which we conceive of others and think of our 
own possibilities and potentialities” (Hacking 2002, 6). 
Instead of pointing out the places that clinical psychological practise, educational 
and legal frameworks failed to conceptualize the relational aspect of the adolescent body, 
where the limit is rendered insignificant and external to the engagement, my study argues 
that psychosocial case reasoning offers a potential for a new type of engagement with 
current issues in the provision of adolescent care. Here the limit is understood to be 
integral to the engagement in care relations. This dissertation maintains that 
understanding the relational and intersubjective dimensions of the body as central aspects 
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of human development provides us with a much more detailed and nuanced 
understanding of the impasses around current issues in the ways social establishments 
provision adolescent care. 
There are two significant limitations that clarify my use of cases in this study. The 
first limitation stems from the methodological aspect. Throughout I employ cases such as 
textbooks and legal cases. My use of cases follows Forrester and Kuhn, who spoke of 
how cases as exemplars can serve to illustrate a “group’s unproblematic conduct of 
research” and focus on what binds a professional community together (Kuhn 1974, 
22).  The cases I draw on are not employed as proof or counter-argument; I have chosen 
these cases not for their representational capacity, but for their capacity to highlight and 
qualify the “research activity itself” (Kuhn 2012, 1). Kuhn once famously pointed out 
that making generalizations about a professional activity only on the basis of textbooks is 
analogous to learning about a “national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a 
language text” (1). Textbooks, among other objects I have chosen to study, speak to a 
shared exemplarity that “aim[s] to communicate the vocabulary of a contemporary 
scientific language” (136). 
The second limitation is linked to what Kuhn (2012) termed 
“incommensurability” (148). In the analysis of cases, I carry out two different readings. I 
read the cases in terms of the epistemology that I find they are already rendered by and 
from the epistemology embedded in psychosocial theory. Hence, in my analysis I do not 
aim at evaluating proof because the tension between competing epistemologies is not 
“resolve[d] by proofs” (Kuhn 2012, 148). Rather, I engage with the dynamic and logic of 
the provision of care in different frameworks. It is also important to note that while 
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analysing the cases, when I focus on the practitioner in a given framework, my interest is 
not to critique therefore implying an atypical, unusual, or maladroit handling of the 
situation yet this does not characterize my engagement with the case reasoning as 
producing “falsification” (146). In working with cases, my interest is informed by the 
way Kuhn understood the common practice of a professional activity as derived from the 
“incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit, at any time” (146). 
The cases that this study draws from, then, are analysed to show the limits of 
thinking in certain professions and the manifestations of resistance in these professions in 
relation to the exemplars. Here I follow Kuhn’s argument that a professional activity is 
carried out on the basis of cultivated professional “background provided by expectation” 
pedagogical relations that guides the practitioner to render each case legible (64). Each 
case, the concept of exemplar suggests, refers to the practitioner’s engagement with the 
question of limit and decisions that transform the limit into a professional activity. A 
practitioner, whether this is in law, educational, or psychological clinical practice, 
engages with the limit. The exemplar, in this sense, is the shared way of making the case 
legible despite the imperfection of the data-theory fit. Because the exemplar inherits a 
fundamental difficulty that follows a self-authenticating logic of practice it can thus 
easily act as “evidence for the theory, the reasons why it ought to be believed” (80). 
Following this tradition of critique, this study avoids cultivating an interest in grandiose 
statements about what the adolescent suffers from, the nature of the adolescent brain, or 
what education should do about adolescence. This study is, rather, an open debate on the 
research and responses to impasses in contemporary adolescent subjectivity with an eye 
to their “normal problem-solving activity” (Kuhn 2012, 75). My interest is in the 
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knowledge embedded in shared examples concentrated “not [on] a subject matter” but on 
how it governs “a group of practitioners” (179). 
1.5. Chapter outlines 
Chapter two starts with the idea that what gives the permeating formulations of 
adolescent experience their impersonal, non-relational, and asocial qualities is their 
assumption that “biological irregularities” lie in the stress and sorrows of adolescent 
experience (Vanheule 2017, 4). This pervading assumption opens to a neglected conflict 
explored through the analysis of a case. It is one where we see the continued uses of the 
adolescent body rendered non-dynamic through biological irregularities as a causal 
explanation whereas the lack of supporting evidence is not sufficient to maintain a 
correlational hypothesis. The case is that of Gavin Grimm, a transgender American high 
school student who takes up a lawsuit with the school board. I analyze this case through 
historical and theoretical underpinnings of the non-dynamic adolescent body that bring us 
to two intersecting inquiries on the provision of adolescent care in contemporary social 
establishments: What does it mean to imagine the provision of adolescent care and 
maintain its authority by way of statistical reasoning that de-prioritizes the dimensions of 
subjectivity through the assumption that “the context of [the] individual (i.e. the life 
history, social circumstances, and cultural background) is thought to play only a minor 
moderating role?”  (Vanheule 2017, 4). What are some implications of this imagining for 
both adolescent subjectivity and the provision of care that involve various social 
establishments concerned with adolescent development? I analyse these questions by 
looking at the ways formulations of the adolescent body are taken up by the provision of 
care. My analysis is predicated upon carefully analyzing the dynamic of exemplar that the 
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medical approach to adolescence stresses and sorrows as its crisis. Working with the 
ethical, clinical, and educational implications of relying on markers of biological 
irregularities as the central mode of approaching adolescent subjectivity, I maintain, is 
not only the central part of responding to the adolescent but also the central dimension of 
maintaining the care for quality of self for it provides “apparent adequations” through the 
“logic [of] recursivity” (Cornell 1990, 220). I make a plea for an approach that aims to 
stay with the subjective dimension of the work of the provision of care where the limit is 
not locked into an anomaly but becomes integral to the question of how to understand 
and respond to contemporary adolescent subjectivity. 
In Chapter three, I concentrate on the difficulties and strength of the subjective 
and intersubjective qualities of adolescent experience and the provision of care, the 
absence of which are the major pillars of non-dynamic formulations adolescent 
subjectivity. I discuss the limit that subjectivity and intersubjectivity pose on the 
imaginary of adolescent education. Adolescent education provides a unique opportunity 
because education illustrates the increasingly diminishing contexts of intersubjectivity 
upheld in formulations of adolescent subjectivity because education is the natural 
guarantor for adolescent development. The adolescent body in education illustrates how 
reception, representation, and response to adolescent experience are major consequences 
of the non-dynamic adolescent body that we find often drift to the wider tensions of 
sovereignty, boundaries between childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and other limits, 
such as those between learning and not learning, and between what is ordinary and what 
is not. I discuss how the provision of care in education is locked into disowning the 
significance of the limit through non-dynamic formulations of adolescent sorrows and 
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stress when the question of limit that is exposed by the adolescent body fails to be 
engaged through subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In this way I aim to counter 
arguments that may see intersubjectivity and education as less rigorous than 
psychological and legal readings of the limit and therefore provision of adolescent 
subjectivity. 
In Chapter four, I consider the popular imaginary of the adolescent body through 
the question of technology because adolescents’ use of technology has become the most 
anxiety-provoking concern of adolescent development. Technology, for this reason, has 
increasingly signified the failure of social institutions and adolescent development. Here I 
discuss two directions taken in social establishments in the modes of describing the shift 
in care regarding adolescents’ relations to technology, a relation succinctly described by 
Bernard Stiegler (2010) as “the new guardians of youth” (51). The adolescents 
overwhelming use and dependence on technology, I argue, is as an expression of 
dissociation and sometimes as a means to solidify their engagement (association) in a 
social establishment. In this chapter, starting from psychosocial suppositions about 
engagement and disengagement through the works of Winnicott (2012b), Leader (2009; 
2011; 2016) and Goffman (1963), I make a case for considering the adolescent body as 
perpetually subject to the tension of dissociation and association in their efforts to 
become someone. By drawing on relationality as the interplay between association-
dissociation present in bodily expression right from infancy onwards, I suggest that a 
psychosocial approach to the image of dissociation and adolescence opens onto an 
overlooked aspect of the body in formulations of adolescent subjectivity, technology, and 
instituted care. 
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In Chapter five I concentrate on the idealization of the non-dynamic adolescent 
body through the  caregiver’s claims of critical detachment. One form this takes is in a 
commitment to approach adolescent suffering as a psychological disturbance and a failed 
biology. The insistence the adolescent adhere to social conventions forecloses the 
capacity of care. This chapter moves to a short story and memoir to discuss a 
psychosocial reading of fantasies of behaviour and feelings that allow us to engage with 
the juncture between the work of care and the experience of subjectivity. It offers us a 
glimpse of what gets lost in claims of critical detachment. I turn to two literary figures. 
The first is the character of Bartleby in Herman Melville’s (2009) famous story “Bartleby 
the Scrivener”, and the second is the memoir of Herculine Barbin that was found and 
published by Michel Foucault (2010). These literary figures present the interplay of being 
a body versus having a body in conversation with the questions of care. I discuss the 
implications of considering “how we read and to what end” (Felski 2015, 6). My focus 
here is with the ways in which the onlooker and the adolescent interpret their respective 
experiences. This turn will help us address the intimate link in the articulations of 
subjectivity for which bodily expressions become difficulties for those involved in 
questions and protests of representation, response, and reception. 
My aim in this dissertation is to illustrate a dual movement at work in the 
provision of care in social establishments which is clear in recourses to the non-dynamic 
body: it is the movement between the adolescent as being a body versus the adolescent as 
having a body. The duality of the adolescent as being a body and the adolescent as having 
a body will illustrate why particular formulations of the adolescent as a body become 
only plausible through the externalization of the experience of care. By externalization I 
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mean to signify the refusal to be involved in the relationship of care. Or, the idea that  
helping is objectified and split off from the helper. This psychological process is akin 
Felski (2014) terms as “critical detachment” in reading. There, the reader disidentifies 
from with the character’s situation. A critique of externalization is key to considering 
why expressions of adolescent subjectivity and the work of care offer us a new picture of 
how relationality is embedded in the struggle to inhabit a body. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Chapter 2: Adolescent Suffering as Bodily Expressions and the Clinic’s Response 
2.1. Introduction 
Gavin Grimm is a high school student living in Gloucester County, 
Virginia.  While continuing his studies in high school Gavin transitioned from female to 
male , without sex-reassignment surgery.  Following his transition, Gavin requested to 
use the boy’s bathroom rather than the single stall bathroom at his school. The request 
was first granted by the school and then met with refusal after the school held a town hall 
meeting which allowed parents and community to give input. After the town meeting the 
school issued a resolution that the use of male and female restrooms and locker rooms 
"shall be limited to the corresponding biological genders, and students with gender 
identity issues shall be provided an alternative private facility” (Gloucester County 
School Board, 4). With the support of the ACLU, a Non-profit Organization that offers 
legal support, Gavin Grimm mounted a human rights case to appeal this decision and 
reinstate his human right to use the boy’s bathroom. 
This sketch of the case of Grimm outlines this chapter’s inquiry. In this chapter I 
investigate the meanings and implications of receiving, representing, and responding to 
adolescent subjectivity through non-dynamic formulations of the adolescent body. This 
discourse, which I will call the discourse of internalisation, disseminates from the use of 
epidemiological studies in clinical psychological frameworks. I demonstrate that the case 
of Gavin Grimm exemplifies a current limitation of institutional frameworks concerned 
with adolescent development. Relying on biological markers has become the central way 
of maintaining what Niklas Luhmann (1986) calls “the logic of recursivity” (quoted in 
Cornell 1990, 120). This logic is embedded in systems, including both legal and 
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educational establishments, so as to acquire a self-maintaining quality. The self-
maintaining quality is what enables operations of professional practices such as law to 
rely on a self-authenticating internal structure. This allows the practitioner to rely on the 
internal logic of a system to render a case legible. 
In the context of this chapter the logic of recursivity refers to the ways that the 
discourse of internalisation is embedded in how contemporary adolescent subjectivity is 
discursively formulated in social establishments. I maintain that the adolescent body, 
constructed through the discourse of internalisation, is the chief component through 
which the institutional provisions of care maintain themselves as self-authenticating 
establishments. Formulations of the adolescent body appear as an enforced equation 
between the discourse of internalisation on body and the discourse on care. Following the 
same logic, this discourse on the adolescent body enables the legal system to maintain the 
“seeming adequation” of the legal system and justice; in education it helps educational 
institutions to maintain a belief in the link between education and adolescent 
development; and in the clinical psychological frameworks it comes into view in the 
idealized equation that connects psychotherapy and care. 
This chapter inquires into the operationally closed establishment concerned with 
the provision of care for contemporary adolescent subjectivity and asks what happens to 
self-maintaining systems when a subject’s situation cannot be adequately translated into 
the terms of a system. For Cornell (1990) the risk of failing to respond to Grimm’s claim 
has ethical and legal consequences for the profession and for the subject as this risk is at 
work in any case where the function of a system is defined as immanent in its modus 
operandi. As for my discussion, I ask, what happens when an adolescent's claim cannot 
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be translated into legal, educational, or clinical systems? This risk cannot be separated 
from the system’s normative closure because it paves the way for practitioners “to be 
caught in a mechanism in which they cannot escape” (Cornell, 121). 
In the first part of the chapter, I examine the structure of the uses of the adolescent 
body as non-dynamic through a close analysis of Gavin Grimm. Gavin Grimm’s story 
starts with a request to use the male washroom which precipitated a series of events that 
began in a psychologist’s consulting room, moved into the offices of school 
administration, from there travelled to the school board, and ended up in courtrooms. 
Here I investigate the underlying dynamic of that imaginary by looking at how this case 
offers a shared ground for the actors in these educational, legal, and psychological 
frameworks. 
The second part of this chapter takes the dilemmas in responses to Grimm’s 
request to the structural level. The introduction of the new category of “Gender 
Dysphoria” is illustrative of the logic of recursivity and its ethical, educational, and 
clinical, implications (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 451). This involves a 
methodological discussion that is inherently linked to historical, administrative, and 
political decisions and responses, to the gender trouble afflicting the helping professions. 
I insist on a pedagogical turn toward these methodological and epistemological questions 
by way of focusing on the question of limit exposed by Grimm’s case.  
2.2. The limit of normative closure and its implications 
 Gavin Grimm’s story supports us to observe the logic of reasoning in decisions 
based on the discourse of internalisation because the discourse of internalization on 
adolescent subjectivity is implicitly and explicitly present in formulations of the 
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adolescent body as non-dynamic. Grimm’s story begins in his sophomore year of high 
school. After transitioning, Gavin Grimm informed the school principal “armed with a 
note from a licensed doctor diagnosing him with gender dysphoria” (Riley 2016, para. 
13). When he informed the school principal about his transition, Grimm received his 
support: “I assure you, in my school, you’re not going to get flak from teachers. And if 
any bullying should occur, it will not continue to occur if you report it” (Riley 2016, para. 
50). At first Grimm did not request to use the boys’ washroom, instead he asked to use 
the nurse’s washroom for fear of his reception. After a while he communicated his 
request to use the boy’s washroom to the school principal and the principal’s response 
was affirmative: “‘I don’t really have a reason to say no, so we’ll say yes and see how it 
goes” (Riley 2016, para. 50). 
After this exchange, Grimm used the boys’ washroom without incident for seven 
weeks. The Gloucester County School Board overruled the school's decision after an 
anonymous complaint was logged. The complaint quickly made its way to the Gloucester 
County School Board, “which placed Grimm at the top of its meeting agenda” (Riley 
2016, para.13). Grimm’s request was subsequently interpreted as inappropriate. 
The school held a subsequent meeting open to parents. The arguments made by 
parents fell back on concerns over safety and moralism. After this meeting, Grimm’s 
access to the boys’ washroom was barred. The board deemed that providing an “alternate, 
private facility”—a unisex washroom—would be the appropriate response. In addition to 
the boys’ and girls’ washrooms, the school was pressed to furnish another washroom. 
The school hastily overhauled an unused janitor's closet for Grimm and any other 
transgender students to access. The new facility was a dark and closeted space, and 
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Grimm instead made use of the washroom in the nurse's station while he followed up his 
request with the courts. 
Grimm would take the School Board’s decision to the District Court. There, the 
judge presiding over Gavin Grimm’s lawsuit stated, “I have no problem with transgender. 
I have a lot of problems with sex" (Holden 2015, para. 7). Here, the judge refers to the 
language of Title IX of the American Education Act which provides the protective 
language “[n]o  person... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance” (Title IX of 20 U.S.CA §  168).  Judge 
Doumar rejected considering the claim on the grounds of Title IX. Grimm’s claim draws 
on the argument that it is one's right to use the bathroom that corresponds with gender 
identity rather than gender at birth. As Jeannie Suk Gerson (2016) of the New Yorker 
reported, “an official at the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, or O.C.R., 
responded to the situation with a short opinion letter stating that schools “‘must treat 
transgender students consistent with their gender identity’ (rather than, say, sex assigned 
at birth, genitalia, reproductive organs, or chromosomes)” (para. 4). This letter cites Title 
IX in the formulation of language used to guarantee the rights of transgender students to 
participate in school according to self-identification. 
 In the judge’s words, “I have no problem with transgender, I have a lot of 
problems with sex,” it appears that the judge's problem lies in sex as a biological 
assignment that enters into the scene of adjudication through the language of Title IX 
(Holden, 2015, para. 7). Judge Doumar’s refusal to consider Gavin Grimm’s request 
illustrates that the problem of normative foreclosure persists in the legal discourse of law 
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that permeates through social establishments of care. His response can be seen as 
constrained by the law’s professional conventions. Judge Doumar’s responses are 
illustrative for their capacity to show us the question of limit in law as the central aspect 
of its operation which constitutes a significant occasion to approach the adolescent body 
as a question of care, ethics, and justice.  
 The initial legal response to Grimm reveals a floating imagination at the heart of 
the institutional difficulty with adolescent sexuality that prevailed in the law as a 
difficulty with gender identity that does not correspond with sex assigned at birth. The 
question of gender was not a new issue. Gender has previously provided a persuasive 
ground for permitting students to access facilities such as showers, toilets, and locker 
rooms in schools. To implement, regulations referred to Title IX to permit the provision 
of a “separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such 
facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities for 
students of the other sex.” (34 C.F.R. § 106.33) The Office for Civil Rights, a sub-agency 
of the Department of Education responsible for the enforcement of Title IX in 
educational institutions, had previously brought to court several cases of “students who 
were subject to harassment or discrimination on the basis of their gender identity, gender 
expression, or failure to conform to gender stereotypes”. (Carlson 2012, 2-3). The scope 
wasn’t extended to transgender students. What Gavin’s request exposes is the normative 
idealism in different systems including education, law, and psychology in their relation to 
gender. 
The case became more complicated after its dismissal on the grounds of Title IX. 
After losing his case, Gavin Grimm appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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Attorneys appealed based on the new category of “Gender Dysphoria” (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013, 451) which replaced the category of “Gender Identity 
Disorder” (American Psychiatric Association 2000, 535). This court deals with 
applications of reversal of jurisdiction of district court decisions. On April 19 2016, a 
three-judge panel vacated Doumar's decision regarding Title IX. In G. G., by his next 
friend and mother, Deirdre Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board (15-2056  (4th 
Cir. 2016), the three-judge panel pointed out the government’s “interpretation of its own 
ambiguous regulation” (16), it “conclude[d] that the district court used the wrong 
evidentiary standard in assessing G.G.’s motion for a preliminary injunction […] and 
“remand[ed] the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion”. 
In the meantime, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice 
issued a joint letter entitled “Dear Colleague” in May 2016 with the intent to inform 
educators on how “to ensure that all students, including transgender students, can attend 
school in an environment free from discrimination based on sex” (U.S Department of 
Education 2016, para. 1). Considering Title IX, this joint statement outlines four 
obligations educators must uphold to secure students’ rights alongside “Examples of 
Policies and Emerging Practices for Supporting Transgender Students” (U.S Department 
of Justice and U.S Department of Education 2016b). The letter explains the term 
transgender in relation to sex and gender to outline schools’ obligations to secure 
transgender students “equal access to educational programs and activities even in 
circumstances in which other students, parents, or community members raise objections 
or concerns” (U.S Department of Justice and U.S Department of Education 2016a, 2). 
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 The letter contains a sophisticated view of gender to cover transgender students’ 
status in schools by treating identified gender as sex. The Department of Justice issued a 
public press release alongside the letter to outline the steps that schools are expected to 
take: 
1- Respond promptly and effectively to sex-based harassment of all students, 
including harassment based on a student's actual or perceived gender identity, 
transgender status, or gender transition; 
2-Treat students consistent with their gender identity even if their school records 
or identification documents indicate a different sex; 
3-Allow students to participate in sex-segregated activities and access sex-
segregated facilities consistent with their gender identity; and 
4-Protect students' privacy related to their transgender status under Title IX and 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. (U.S Department of Justice and 
U.S Department of Education 2016a, 2) 
A month after the statement issued by the Department of Education and the Department 
of Justice the Federal Court took up the case that was overturned and sent back by the 
Court of Appeals.  On June 23, Judge Doumar issued a preliminary injunction in Grimm's 
favor. In October 2016, the Supreme Court took up what came to be known in the process 
as the Bathroom Bill, a name that suggests an interpretation of Title IX according to a 
reading where gender is the organizing principle. In March 2017 this bill was reversed 
which, in Grimm’s case, “the Supreme Court announced”, citing the Trump 
administration's withdrawal of the reading of Title IX, “it would not decide whether a 
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transgender boy in Virginia could use the boys’ bathroom at his high school” (Liptak 
2017, para. 1). 
2.3. The adolescent body at the junction of operational closure and ethics 
Responses to Grimm’s story bring us the ethical and professional dilemmas 
pertaining to the provision of care in adolescent education. It must be noted that the 
decisions by Judge Doumar and the school board signal a conflict that is not exceptional 
and which can be attributed to malpractice, yet the conflict is mitigated by law and 
educational conventions where we find an implicit assurance of a possible sexual order 
by maintaining a separation between the signifiers of transgender and sex. It was made 
possible by way of holding the interpretation of Title IX's operative provision to cover 
discrimination on the basis of biological sex only, and not the expression of gender or the 
identified gender. Judge Doumar’s initial refusal to consider the case on the grounds of 
Title IX and the injunction he issues in favour of Grimm, once  his ruling has been 
overturned by the Court of Appeals, exemplifies a problem that we see in Grimm’s case 
playing out specifically in the context of legal positivism and on a larger scale as a 
problem of the ways the limit persists in clinical and educational frameworks. 
In both contexts, the adolescent body is what comes to play as a limit.  The 
problem with the legal interpretation of Grimm’s case derives from the dismissal of the 
significance of the limit that Grimm’s case shows. This is made from the rigid distinction 
between what is internal and what is external to legal, educational, and clinical systems. 
While the rigid distinction enables legal, educational, and clinical interpretations to be in 
line with the functioning of a system, these rigid distinctions risk equating law with 
justice, description with prescription, and judgement with calculation. 
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The joint letter issued by the Department of Education and the Department of 
Justice identifies the limit for accessing educational facilities through positivist legal 
interpretation and illustrates the ramifications of interpreting sex as equated with gender. 
Judge Doumar’s initial dismissal of Grimm’s request under Title IX mirrors the 
confusion of sex and gender held ambiguously by law where sex is tied to biological 
markers. In reading the responses to Gavin Grimm’s request we find implicit recognition 
of the limit in current relations to adolescent development and, too, in the responses that 
dismiss Grimm’s request to be considered on the grounds of Title IX. The legal limitation 
is recognized yet not rendered significant.  
 This is where we find what Cornell (1990) speaks of as the limit embedded in the 
positivist legal imagination, which in result, paves the way for collapsing law and justice, 
and for prescription to collapse description. Most crucially, I want to draw attention to 
how the discourse of internalisation on the adolescent body appears as the crux that 
discussions fall back on to create a response to subjective experience. 
Cornell’s (1990) work on legal positivism provides a useful way to reflect on the 
conflict of the provision of care embedded in the status of the adolescent body in 
Grimm’s case. Cornell argues that recognising the juridical and legal significance of the 
limit of legal positivism helps us form an ethical relation to what is other to the system. 
There is simple question that points out the significance of limit for a subject who is 
subject to the legal system which Cornell points out: what happens to the questions of 
judgement, interpretation, and ethics “if a victim’s claim can still not be adequately 
translated” in a legitimate and functioning law where justice is defined as immanent 
within an operative system of law? (132) Cornell claims that when justice is defined as 
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something already integral to the maintenance of a legal system, it “reinstates a circular 
mode of justification that turns on what already is. Therefore, such an appeal still 
collapses prescription and description” (132). These ideas are based on a reflection of 
prevailing ideas found in the operation of traditional positivist law. Legal positivism, 
Cornell maintains, is predicated upon its capacity to achieve a “normative closure,” that 
is to say, a self-maintained system formed through a set of internal operations (122). 
 The dilemma lies in the legal imagination that relies on legal positivism. In the 
prevailing legal imagination we find what Niklas Luhmann described as “autopoiesis” a 
function of normative law that refers to “recursive operations of self-referential 
systems”  (1995, xxi). Autopoiesis derives from a biological concept and refers to a 
system that is able to reproduce itself. It depends on the assumption that law functions as 
long as it is an operationally closed system. Cornell explains this succinctly: 
The central thesis of autopoiesis as it has been succinctly summarized is that legal 
propositions or norms must be understood within a self-generating system of 
communication which both defines relations with the outside environment and 
provides itself with its own mechanism of justification. Autopoiesis conserves law 
as an autonomous system that achieves full normative closure through 
epistemological constructivism. (1990, 122) 
The risk is at the intersection of responsibility and justice, where judgement presents a 
dilemma. A judgement that relies on legal positivism is predicated upon the operational 
closure to remain a system. This makes it dependant upon rigid distinctions of internal 
and external. 
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The suggestion that Cornell makes is that without appealing to an external order 
or submitting to the internal distinction, “boundaries yield [and] the conception of what is 
internal and external can be redefined” (142). As we approach this limit we translate 
towards a delimited system rather than getting rid of the system or dismissing the 
dynamics of a  system. The insistence on what is internal and external in explaining the 
function of a system can explain the “self-maintenance of a legal system, but such theory 
cannot explain justice, because Justice, at least defined by Derrida, is precisely the limit 
of the legal system” (143).  
 With this discussion on the idealism of legal positivism in mind, we can turn to 
Grimm’s case. A focus on the limit in Grimm’s case shows us a unique dimension of the 
use of recourses to the non-dynamic adolescent body and gives us a new reading of the 
relationship between law, justice, care, development, responsibility, and interpretation. 
To emphasize the limit in responses will lead to a fresh focus on the adolescent body—
whether in legal judgements, educational decisions, or clinical formulations—it will be a 
focus that avoids interpretation in that it is a covert projection of what should be rather 
than what is. 
2.4. Avoiding experience: opening arguments of splitting  
 The legal and educational responses to adolescent sexuality serve as substantial 
examples for thinking about the limit of the logic of recursivity embedded in institutional 
responses to adolescent subjectivity. In Title IX there is a blurry zone that fails to 
translate adolescent sexuality. In consequence, Title IX exposed a limit with the potential 
to engage adolescent experience and this limit was felt by professionals. The potential 
was  overlooked because the limit was rendered irrelevant by the normative foreclosure 
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of the law. Disowning the significance of limit led to a number of splittings. The splitting 
at stake here is in the institutional responses grounded in biomedical approaches that 
propose a clear separation between adolescence and adulthood, development and 
stagnancy, and order and disorder. We can observe this splitting in the case of Grimm 
where we find a series of renounced links: Besides renouncing the relationship between 
sex and gender, Judge Doumar, overruled the ACLU’s plea that Grimm’s case be 
considered under Title IX. Grimm’s initial therapist, too, is implicated in the logic of 
splitting, as in response to Grimm coming out as transgender. The therapist failed to 
sustain interest in the nature of Grimm’s experience by saying, “You don’t have to 
explain yourself,” and, “I get it” (Riley 2016, para. 44). Each time Grimm’s request 
manifested in an institutional setting it created an event. While each setting yielded to 
different internal logic, each of the responses from the judge, psychologist, and school 
board illustrates the question of the limit of thinking. “You don’t have to explain 
yourself,” said the psychologist, when Grimm wanted to explain himself. “I have a 
problem with sex” the judge said when the problem was with identity founded on notions 
of gender grounded in the biological assignment of sex. Grimm’s request to have his 
lived reality acknowledged apart from the discourse of ‘explanation’ and ‘disorder’, 
reveals the limits of those discourses in their address of adolescent sexuality. These 
examples point to an experience of responding that is difficult to account for, and, at its 
best and, at its worst, borders on discrimination and abuse.  
 The notions of the limit and singularity of the subject in the law and the clinical 
field found in the works of John Forrester (2016) and Drucilla Cornell (1990) can give us 
a new way to think about the ethical dilemmas in recourses to the non-dynamic 
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adolescent body. Both Forrester and Cornell, albeit in different disciplinary terms, but 
using the method of the case, draw on the significance the limit might pose to social 
establishments of care, not as an anomaly to dismiss but as integral to professional 
practice, where it is a way to resolve the tension between generalities of a profession and 
the singularity of a case even if the limit presents an anomalous profile for the 
professional. 
For Forrester the limit serves a fundamental role in the practice of professions like 
clinical medicine, law, and anthropology. Although the capacity to respond to the 
singularity of a case is what constitutes each practice; each field confronts what we can 
tentatively call the danger of the limit where we might fall short, dismiss, overlook, or 
fail to respond in accordance with the generalities of the discipline. Law, for Forrester is 
exemplary for the question of singularity. In law the problem of singularity manifests 
around the question of equity. “Equity”, Forrester (2016) writes, “is a branch of law that 
refuses principles, refuses generality to deliver justice” (128). We can add that the 
institution’s ethical and responsible relation to adolescent experience is linked to its 
capacity to respond to the singularity of experience. For Cornell the limit serves a 
practical purpose. The limit links a juridical query to “questions of ethics, justice, and 
legal interpretation” (1990, 1). The notion of limit points to what idealism fails to 
capture—that ‘reality’ is not a blunt limitation per se but a significant possibility to 
reflect on the rigid distinctions between internal and external in the operation of a system. 
The logic of limit reveals the self-referential dynamic of a system that can be an obstacle 
to perceiving singularity in its complexity. The limit shows us where the law breaks 
down in its adjudication of experience that cannot hold to its prescription of human life. 
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The limit, for both scholars, is what exists in every case.  
 Because responses to adolescent subjectivity have been dramatically informed by 
the biomedical imagination, the limit that might contribute to reflecting on the 
profession’s capacity to respond is lost and rendered as irrelevant, insignificant, or even 
untouched. We can see this problematic at work in Grimm’s case. For example, take the 
first phase of his request. At school Grimm’s request was first confirmed and then 
overruled. And with the therapist, his concern was noticed and yet pre-empted. Gavin’s 
request at the board meeting was met with a similar movement: His educational request 
was quickly ruled out by parental questions. Just as the educational frame collapses into 
the legal one, sex collapses into gender, and adolescent experience of sexuality collapses 
into that of the adult’s problem with sex. In each context the suspension of Grimm’s 
claims—the educational claim in the school, the psychological claim in the clinic, the 
legal claims in the courts, his request to participate in school life with the approval of the 
context of his demand—these were  overlooked due to the discourse of internalization 
predicated upon a biological marker. 
In the following section I sketch out the logic of biomedical idealism at work in 
the internalisation discourse of clinical psychological frameworks. In doing this my 
guiding principle is to describe what happens to the limit and how it directly served 
clinical psychological frameworks and indirectly other frameworks such as education and 
the legal in their relation to adolescent subjectivity. By following this guiding inquiry I 
avoid rehearsing the well-worn debates of order-disorder, health-pathology, and cure-
cause that Judith Butler famously called “the circular ruins of contemporary debate,” 
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which inevitably lead to provisional and temporary triumphalism (2011, 11). 
 2.5. The crisis of exemplar and its resolution 
The responses to Grimm’s request show that in each situation there is an 
assumption of  sexuality (through claims about adolescence, bodies, and parenting) as a 
purely biological phenomenon, as self-evident empirical knowledge that can be seen in 
the routine backslide to moralism, and as non-dynamic biologism which tenders proof. In 
this view t sexuality has nothing to do with a profession’s ethical or professional 
responsibilities. In his 1996 paper “Has Sexuality Anything to do with Psychoanalysis?” 
André Green reminds us that our interpretation of sexuality has drifted towards 
compartmentalization and notes the significance that sexuality brings to clinical 
frameworks: “[sexuality] is no longer considered to be a major factor in child 
development… It is as if sexuality were now considered a topic of specialised 
significance, a limited area of the internal world among other such” (871). Green is 
attentive to the absenting of sexuality in clinical frameworks, one that resembles one’s 
early confusion about genitality and sexuality. With an eye to the horizons of 
interpretation, Green raises a lucid question that takes on the different orientations of the 
clinical framework by asserting the problematic: what if sexuality is ignored and limited 
to the manifest level?  Ian Parker (2011) raises a similar concern in his book Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. Parker observes that in the clinic the role of sexuality is either avoided or 
obscured through “pious appeals to sweet reason, dissolving sex into attachment in 
'relationships'” (16). Both Parker and A. Green point out the disappearance of sexuality as 
integral dimensions of subjectivity through an increasingly pressing picture of the non-
dynamic realm of subjectivity. In what follows, I ask what it might mean to search for an 
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engagement with adolescent experience without recourse to a non-dynamic view of the 
adolescent body. 
The objectifying of Grimm’s request to participate in school life with self-identity 
is tied to the history of clinical diagnosis espoused by the DSM. The case of the invention 
of Gender Dysphoria is an example of the nuances of the diagnostic authority that persists 
despite its own logic. Some thirty-five years after the major shift marked by the third 
revision of the DSM, Robert Spitzer and Kenneth Zucker (2005), held to be among the 
chief architects of modern classifications of mental disorders, commented on their 
motivation for introducing the entity of Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood Diagnosis 
into the DSM III despite there being insufficient data to support such a classification. The 
justifications for why GIDC was introduced take us to the heart of the matter regarding 
idealism: 
We argue that GIDC was included as a psychiatric diagnosis because it met the 
generally accepted criteria used by the framers of DSM-III for inclusion (for 
example, clinical utility, acceptability to clinicians of various theoretical 
persuasions, and an empirical database to propose explicit diagnostic criteria that 
could be tested for reliability and validity). In this respect, the entry of GIDC into 
the psychiatric nomenclature was guided by the reliance on “expert consensus” 
(research clinicians)—the same mechanism that led to the introduction of many 
new psychiatric diagnoses, including those for which systematic field trials were 
not available when the DSM-III was published. (31) 
The emphasis placed by Spitzer and Zucker on clinical utility and expert consensus is a 
useful place to start. Questions regarding adolescent sexuality had already begun prior to 
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the publication of the DSM III, especially with gender variant children with a special 
focus on gender variant boys; these normative approaches mainly formulated how to 
detect and treat gender variant children (R. Green 1967; R. Green and Money 1960; 
1961). With normative visions of the development of boys and girls in mind, the DSM III 
hastily introduced the category of Gender Identity Disorder following the studies carried 
out by sexologists Richard Green and John Money. In these studies we find gender 
variance is identified as a great risk and therefore in need of treatment (Bryant 2006).  
 The urgency in these studies was one of the chief reasons why just a handful of 
case studies was considered sufficient to draw conclusions and confidence for handling 
the complexity of the experience of gender. Some of the studies were carried out through 
discourses which claimed to determine the real of sexuality based on birth assignment 
and external observation that paved the way for ‘behavioral modification’ (Rekers 1977). 
Rekers proposed notions of atypical gender development and psychosocial adjustment as 
therapeutic treatments that aim to transform what seemed to atypical to whatever was 
held to be typical (Rekers 1977). The early imaginary on which the DSM III based its 
conceptualization of GIDC, pulled from methods such as Rekers’ who “used classic 
reinforcement techniques to extinguish feminine behaviours and replace them with 
masculine ones” (Bryant 2006, 28).  
 The baseline for what was perceived to be atypical changed constantly, to the 
point that parents and teachers were drawn into the behavioral program to ensure the time 
“feminine boys” spent with their sisters was reduced to zero or near zero in order to 
eliminate feminine content. These efforts still amounted to statistical failure as the field 
studies did not support the assumptions proposed in the DSM III and consequently were 
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dropped. 
 These studies can be understood as a selective reification of sexuality, and more 
accurately of the body, by treating it as the result of some sort of mistake. And yet, the 
basic mismatch between how the body is experienced and how it is perceived that is 
presented in the nature of embodiment resists this reification. The translation of sexuality 
through the concretization of knowledge embedded in causal accounts of the body 
relieves us of the work of choice and interpretation by assuming to provide the “real” of 
sexuality as a self-contained phenomenon. Leader (2006) points to this basic mismatch: 
[t]he footage of a crying baby shown to an audience told it was a boy took it as 
transparent that ‘he’ was angry, yet when the baby was described as a ‘she’ this 
‘anger’ became ‘sadness’. What we see thus depends on our expectations and 
what we are taught to look for. One hundred years of history and philosophy of 
science and sociology have shown us that the criteria of empirical verification are 
never uncomplicated. (389) 
This mismatch is the exact spot where the discourse of internalisation is employed so that 
bodily parts do the work on our behalf. This discourse verifies the concretization of 
knowledge and yet risks dropping subjectivity as it leans upon the readily available 
external imaginary. 
Diagnoses that rely solely on external validation of sex organs through a recourse 
to the adolescent body can be read as what Jacqueline Rose (2011) calls the “return of the 
referent” (224).  The return of the referent, for Rose, is the treatment of “the referent as a 
problem, not as a given” (224). As a failed category Gender Identity Disorder returns us 
to the fantasy of a non-dynamic body that presents us with the absolute sexual difference 
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which shook the clinical field. Through the categorization of gender in the context of 
mental illness, heteronormative categories of gender are equated with health (Corbett 
1997). To that we can add that assessment of  mental health is now being predicated upon 
the non-dynamic adolescent body.  
2.6. Conclusion  
 The adolescent body, read through Gavin Grimm’s case brings to the fore the 
manifold crises in clinical, political, legal, and educational frameworks. To bar the 
experience of adolescent sexuality within the confinements of selectively constructed 
operational logic provides what Gozlan (2015) calls “illusionary reassurances” 
(182).  Illusionary reassurances are at work in the clinically revisionist efforts 
constructing Gender Dysphoria, the Judge’s problem with the assignment of sex, and the 
school psychologist’s view that the school is not required to do anything other than “get” 
a student’s situation. These reassurances compel institutional frameworks to cling to 
fantasies of operationalism that lead to the failure of the helping professional’s 
responsibility to formulate an ethical encounter with difference (Gozlan 2015, 182).  
         Educational and legal responses to Gavin Grimm’s request to access the boys’ 
washroom and clinical debates over Gender Identity Disorder elucidate the subtle—and 
not so subtle—flights to the objectification of the adolescent body through a non-dynamic 
imagination of the body. The attempt to create all-encompassing and distancing 
constructions of development and the body is a way of easing the tension the adolescent 
body underscores in the social establishments. And rather than confining the body to the 
realm of a non-dynamic biological entity and “degrading [its] significance as known and 
certain,” Grimm’s case refuses these confines and insists upon the gendered bodily 
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presence of sexuality in the world (Gozlan 2014, 4).  
 The impossibility of eradicating the relational tension the body creates is not 
foreclosed by the idealization of the body through non-dynamic constructions (Butler 
2011; Dimen and Goldner 2002; Gozlan 2014). The question adolescent sexuality 
presents requires a relational approach (Sandlos 2010), that can enter into conversation 
with the complexities of sexuality rather than rushing to foreclose experience through 
forms of segregation. Responses to Grimm illustrate how the conflict precipitated by his 
request was expressed and solved through splitting and/or the negation of his experience 
by the school board, judge, and therapist. There is a loss in capacity for response as soon 
as the boundaries between adult and adolescent experiences and between sexuality and 
development blur into institutional mandates. Rather than let Grimm use the boys’ 
washroom another washroom was created, reiterating the impossibility to fashion a just 
response to a student’s request to participate fully in school life.  
  The inability of the school, court, clinic, and politics to hear adolescent 
expressions of sexuality and the body continues to trouble them. Rather than rendering 
Grimm’s request to access to washroom as a request as integral to provision of care and 
development, responses of institutional care appears to recourse to another diagnosis, 
another prohibition, another pathology, another form of segregation and alienation from 
themselves and the people they hold dear. In the next chapter I explore the question of 
limit as it plays out in educational frameworks. Education, I argue, holds a great deal of 
significance for thinking about adolescent subjectivity and for the question of limit in 
recourses to the non-dynamic adolescent body. 
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Chapter 3: Who Does the Limit Belong To: Rendering the Limit Exposed by 
Adolescent Ideality as Educational 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins with my brief exchange with student and is used to illustrate 
the central tension in my discussion on the professional recourse to the body where “the 
problem of the other’s mind” poses a significant difficulty for education as ideality 
(Schacter et al. 2009, 235). Kristeva’s (2007) notion of ideality refers to a developmental 
experience in adolescence where idealization becomes the central mode of subjectivity 
for the adolescent to stabilize internal drives and external demands. Expressions of 
ideality are often splittings between the distinctions of self and other, good and bad. 
Kristeva’s notion of ideality is a psychosocial response to predominantly overlooked 
experiences of adolescence known more commonly in the impersonal, asocial, and non-
relational forms of protest, eating disorders, and self-harm, Kristeva instead interprets 
these experiences within an interpersonal and intrapsychic network of relations. 
A student’s remark while assisting in teaching a course on adolescent 
development caught me by surprise.  I was arrested by a student’s claim, “this is not my 
favourite kind of book”. The scene arrives out of many interactions with this student 
whom I will call “Ruvi.”  Ruvi was one of the most talkative students in a class in which 
I worked as a teaching assistant. Ruvi was clearly affected by the course as it did speak to 
the relevance of his day-to-day life. This particular comment of Ruvi’s made me wonder 
if his avid participation was an effort to put the content of the course to a reality test. “I 
think this isn’t my favourite kind of book,” he claimed, in response to my request for 
students to share their thoughts on the lecture and the text. At first glance, it is possible to 
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recognize this comment as a student’s familiar protest against learning, which calls upon 
the educator’s authority. 
And yet, it is difficult to understand what kind of protest this response might 
entail. After all, this wasn’t my course; I was there to facilitate the discussion. Was his 
comment an integral part of the discussion? In other words, this comment made me 
curious as to what degree his remark had something to do with me. Ruvi’s comment 
raised the urgent yet fundamental question of desire, a question one needs to formulate in 
self-other relations: ‘What does the other want?’ (Leader 2011). To situate, mediate and 
contain the emerging affect, I had formulated a response along these lines: ‘The assigned 
text does not have to be our favourite text in order for us to have a discussion about it, 
and it can still be interesting.’ 
My answer to Ruvi’s question appears to reside in the fundamental difficulty of 
perceiving the other’s mind.  In my attempts to formulate what he wants by way of 
defending myself against the particularity of not knowing from where the difficulty 
arrives, I was led to an interplay between the subjective and intersubjective qualities of 
the encounter coloured by the presence of a limit. The seemingly ordinary comment 
showed me the limit, my own and that of the students. I found myself formulating the 
relationship between the student, the course material, and me as a teaching assistant, in 
relation to questions of what it means to be a good teacher, a good student, and to be 
mutually engaged with the material. These questions required me to grapple with the 
meaning of this limit. 
In the same way that Ruvi expressed the idea that the conflict of reading didn’t 
belong to him and was the responsibility of the book itself, I didn’t think the frustration 
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experienced by a student had anything to do with me. The classroom was animated by the 
course material while a subtle and defensive victimhood was quietly being maintained: I 
was the victim of the mismatch between the kind of book assigned for the course and the 
kind of student I had; Ruvi was the victim of the kind of book he was assigned and 
perhaps the kind of teacher he had. 
My pedagogical encounter with Ruvi provides entry into analyzing the dual 
nature of adolescent ideality in education at the junction of a question of limits and 
relationality. As with a book a young person does not want to read, adolescent ideality 
poses a limit on education and splitting of good and bad education. Then, bad education 
becomes like a threat to its project to make the adolescent body conform to the dictates of 
the instituted education. Ideality here refers to common formations of relationality found 
in institutional education such as refusals, self-harm, revolt, and resistance. Ideality, as 
seen in these formations, is often taken as a sign of disruption in the continuity of 
education and adolescent development. The institution of education is bundled with the 
task of mediating this experience through syllabus plans, grade corridors, counseling and 
career services, drama courses, and self-harm policies. We have evolved standardized 
learning outcomes that promise continuity (DeVitis & Irwin-DeVitis 2010; McMahan 
and Thompson 2014; Arnett 2013). Regardless of the ways they are handled, student 
idealities, or the belief that there is a better educational paradise than the one on offer, 
disrupt the mediating dimension of education and these disruptions lead to and are 
already the symptoms of discontinuities. 
Contemporary researchers in the field of adolescent education forefront 
relationality as the major factor in maintaining continuity in times of transition 
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(Shochet,  Dadds,  Ham, and Montague 2006; Whitlock 2010). Education is increasingly 
noted to be the most significant place affecting adolescent mental health. Shochet et al. 
(2006), for instance, emphasize the correlation between the sense of connectedness to 
school and adolescent mental health. While there is a trend that successfully links the 
adolescent experience to adolescent education and adolescent ideality, the ways that 
adolescent education is disrupted are not seen to be integral to self-other relations in 
institutional experience. Conflict that stems from adolescent ideality is often linked to the 
insistences of discontinuities that qualify the matter as a situation in which education is 
lost. Because adolescent ideality jeopardizes the promise of continuity in adolescent 
development with its power to expose the limits of education, ideality stops being posed 
as an educational question and is reserved instead for other logics that are connected 
through the non-dynamic formulations of the adolescent body. Adolescent ideality thus 
precipitates a dual movement: as an educational concern and simultaneously disowned as 
a relation of self/other concerns. We can think a wide range of symptoms of ideality in 
education suchlike self-harm, protest, eating disorders, violence, skipping, school failure, 
and defiance. 
What is exposed initiates a movement that is often handled by being passed on to 
psychiatry, courts of law, and psychologists. The relational meaning of limit is linked to 
ideality in the ways it is theorized in psychosocial studies and it this link that leads me in 
reading my pedagogical encounter with Ruvi. I, too, was subject to the splitting of the 
teacher versus the student. In doing that, the relation was lost and we both had to 
externalize education. These theoretical discussions have remained largely limited to the 
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field of clinical practice—thoroughly theorized in the context of infant care, and child 
and adolescent development.  
The chapter develops three suppositions: ideality is an intersubjective situation; 
the recourse to the adolescent body in education a as non-dynamic phenomenon echoes a 
relational conflict beginning from earlier periods of development; and, education has a 
unique capacity to engage with the question of the limit not as an irrelevant pedagogical 
situation to be reserved for clinical and legal frameworks but as an educational question 
and response to adolescent ideality as an relational situation. These suppositions are 
supported by psychosocial studies of development put forward in the works of analysts 
and educational theorists such as Melanie Klein (1987), Daniel Stern (1995), D.W. 
Winnicott (2013), Julia Kristeva (2011), Deborah Britzman (2009), and Aparna Mishra 
Tarc (2015). 
Part one of the chapter draws on a controversy of self-harm at Northern Michigan 
University to identify and untangle the prevailing paradox of relationality and 
subjectivity in an adolescent education predicated upon the non-dynamic imaginary of 
the body. In particular, I discuss the prevailing response in education to what Kristeva 
(2011) called “adolescent ideality,” which confronts education with its limits regarding 
the question of responsibility, care, and relationality. The response here refers to a dual 
movement that I explore at length throughout the chapter: when adolescent ideality 
exposes the limits of education, education gets dropped as quickly as it is taken up. Here, 
I aim to reframe the question of the limit as a significant constituent of education to 
reflect on its ethical and educational possibilities. 
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The aim of my discussion is not only to engage with the ethical and educational 
consequences of attempting to absorb and transmit the disowned relationality embedded 
in linking adolescent ideality to the non-dynamic body. I extend this inquiry further to 
consider the dilemma of adolescent ideality as an educational question, as a radical 
relationality that “link[s] the limits of practice to the complexity and uncertainty of its 
subjects” (Britzman 2009, 20). 
3.2. Reading the paradoxical limits of the adolescent body in education 
Katerina Klawes is a university student at Northern Michigan University.  In the 
winter of 2014, while continuing her studies, she sought help at the university counselling 
services. Following her visit, Klawes received an email from the Associate Dean of 
Students, part of which read as follows: 
I received a report that others are worried about your well-being. I’d like to meet 
with you to discuss your options for support and see what I can do to help… Our 
self-destructive policy is currently under review, as stated on top of the policy, so 
it is important that you know a couple of things [sic]. First, you will not be 
removed as a student for seeking help from the appropriate resources. You can 
use any of the resources listed below without worry. Second, engaging [sic] in 
any discussion of suicidal or self-destructive thoughts or actions with other 
students interferes with, or can hinder, their pursuit of education and community. 
It is important that you refrain from discussing these issues with other students 
and use the appropriate resources listed below. If you involve other students in 
suicidal or self-destructive thoughts or actions you will face disciplinary action. 
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My hope is that, knowing exactly what could result in discipline, you can avoid 
putting yourself in that position (Beck-Coon 2016, para. 6-7). 
In response to the communication sent by the Associate Dean of Students on March 25, 
2014, Klawes conveys a confusion regarding the limit of engagement: 
the email said that if I spoke to students about it that it would create a 
distraction—which could create disciplinary action against me […] I was also 
wondering if I respond to concerned people, is that enough to get me in trouble? I 
do not want to worry others by not responding and I do not want to have the 
possibility of getting expelled by reaching out to my friends during this 
emotionally trying time and I see the possibility of misunderstanding or getting 
more concerned. (Singal 2016, 1) 
In reply to Klawes’ inquiry the associate Dean of Students provides clarification: “You 
can certainly talk about how you are doing in general and set their minds at ease. You 
cannot discuss with other students suicidal or self-destructive thoughts or actions. It is a 
very specific limitation” (2). Citing an article entitled “NMU policy gets personal”, which 
appeared in the Mining Journal, Beck-Coon reports the wider practice of communicating 
the ‘protocol’ letter found in “the policy 3.12 in the student handbook” that refers to the 
suspension of students based on the occurrence of self-destructive behavior “disruptive to 
the NMU community” (The Mining Journal Nov 24. 2015, para 6). Wardell (2015) 
reports that 25-30 students per semester receive warning letters. 
 As with the case of Grimm, the case of Klawes also reveals a limit at the heart of 
the adolescent’s effort to make her suffering known and recognizable in social space. The 
case sparked a conversation amongst mental health professionals involved in the 
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controversy holding different views on whether students should be removed from 
campuses for sharing their ‘destructive’ thoughts with other students. Marie Aho, the 
Director of Counselling reportedly commented that while their “goal is always to insure 
students get the help they need [...] the policy also aims to protect friends from a 
potentially ‘overdeveloped sense of responsibility’ for the lives of classmates in danger of 
self-harm or suicide” (Wardell 2015, para. 30). Kevin Fisher, Michigan president of the 
National Alliance of Mental Health, also responded to the controversy by drawing 
attention to the function of sharing suicidal feelings with other students. “Communication 
with a friend is frequently the pivotal first step toward seeking help”, he remarked 
ironically. “and many students may be more willing to initially share their feelings with a 
friend than with a school official or therapist” (Barrows 2016, para. 8). 
The policy prescribing limits to what an adolescent can convey of her experience, 
also held implications for human rights. It is pertinent to issues of freedom of speech. The 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education described the practice of removing 
students from university campuses as imposing an “unconstitutional gag order” (Arnold 
2016, para. 15). A letter penned by this association drew on the legal implications of such 
a practise: 
It is an impermissible infringement on NMU students’ right to speak freely on a 
chosen topic without fear of punishment. The First Amendment simply does not 
tolerate a public institution’s regulation of the private conversations of peers in 
such a manner. (Beck-Coon 2016, para. 24) 
When considered along with what I am arguing the prevalent ‘containment’ 
approach to adolescent mental health begins to hold a far greater significance.  Rachel 
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Aviv (2014) notes in a report that the practice of removing suicidal students from 
university settings is widely held. “At Yale, Brown, George Washington University, 
Hunter College, Northwestern, and several other schools, students have protested these 
policies”, through a variety a means. Aviv notes, “by initiating litigation, submitting 
complaints to the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, or writing columns 
in campus newspapers” (Aviv 2014, para. 5). The controversial nature of this debate 
raises a number of questions: Can one both be a student and suffer at the same time? Can 
education be a significant place of response to suffering students? Can education respond 
to the limit that adolescent ideality poses, not as its own limit that must be disowned, but 
rather as an educational question that can be engaged? 
The controversy on expressions of adolescent self-harm outlines the dual 
character of education when it encounters adolescent ideality: Rather than support this 
young woman’s experience, the institution joins the subject of authoritative psychology 
and remains largely within a bureaucratic logic, as a “unitary, non-contradictory subject” 
(Hollway e et al 2003, 128). What is at stake here is the question of the body’s 
significance as a relational phenomena and the significance of care as an intersubjective 
experience. The radical relationality at work in education bears much wider significance 
for the question of adolescent subjectivity, beyond a descriptive engagement. As 
Britzman (2003) insists, instituted education is a “social imaginary” and a “social 
relation,” and wavering between promise and crisis, education “staggers under the heavy 
burden of representing its own cacophony of dreams, its vulnerabilities, and its 
incompleteness” (9). 
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 In the next section, I draw on the double movement of education to identify and 
untangle how the prevailing imposition of the subjects of psychology and law work 
against what is educational in adolescent suffering. Psychoanalytic practitioners have 
long pursued the relational aspect of the body starting from the very early years of life. 
This tradition has repeatedly noted the relationality lying in articulations of ideality not 
only to show why and how it is always a body in need and demand that takes us to the 
intersubjective aspect of care and ideality but also to make a case for the subjectivity of 
the caregiver which has long been removed from the picture of the work of care. 
3.3. Limits of care in adolescent education 
So far adolescent ideality poses a crisis of care that threatens education’s capacity 
to sustain itself as a system, and that the solution we see through the dual movement of 
recognition and disownment allows education to identify the limit and then solve it by a 
privileging of the present (Cornell 1990, 117). In this movement, education gains a 
recursiveness that “allows for the consistency control that enables the system to function 
as a system” (122). The encounter with adolescent ideality precipitates this dual 
movement which can also be understood as an institutional attempt to be operationally 
closed off that comes at the cost of losing what is fundamentally educational. This 
conflict is embedded in the implications of ideality. 
In the context of self-harm this dual movement is conspicuous. The question is 
simple: how should we read this self-harm? Is it an anomaly that indicates an isolated 
occurrence in the education of adolescents or is it a relational conflict that might 
potentially implicate education as integral to the conflict? My argument is the following. 
Treating adolescent ideality as non-relational and impersonal decontextualizes and 
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dehistoricizes conflict and so preempts the educational significance of the conflict. This 
uncoupling, I argue, is the reason why in the educational discourse on adolescent 
development ,adolescent ideality crops up both as a thing-in-itself and as a life preserver 
of significance, not for the adolescent but for institutional maintenance. 
Kristeva’s (2011)’s study Incredible Need to Believe, proposes ideality as an 
ordinary experience of adolescents. Ideality signals the adolescent’s attempts to make 
sense and to regulate the tensions between external demands and internal drives.  Ideality 
is both a defense of certainty and a wish for perfection and no conflict. Kristeva describes 
the adolescent as a ‘believer,’ thus adolescence is an intense time of finding oneself 
through forms of certainty embedded in the behaviours and embodied forms of 
subjectivity. Idealizations can come in the form of “a partner, husband or wife or a 
professional–political–ideological–religious ideal—an ideality” (Kristeva 2007, 720). 
Adolescent ideality corresponds to a continuum of behaviours and feelings that are found 
in ordinary refusals as well as in more alarming images of anorexia, cutting, refusal, and 
addiction. The adult world experiences idealities as non-conformance, a failure to 
complete adolescent development, a deviation from norms. “Whatever the case may be”, 
Kristeva (2011) maintains, “adolescent ideality is necessarily demanding and in a state of 
crisis” as the adolescent “hovers on the verge of breakdown” (16). Adolescent ideality is 
widely held as an indicator of disruptions of adult-adolescent relationships, as a threat to 
the adult community, whether it is in the context of home or school.  The hard approach 
to ideality taken by social establishments aims to put an end to the symptoms of ideality 
through demands of compliance. The turn this takes in institutional responses illustrates 
the relational dynamic of ideality that can be understood through the replication of 
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adolescent ideality in the form of institutional ideality. This occurs when the adolescent’s 
breakdown is read as irrelevant to the social and becomes enacted in the institution as it is 
in the case of Klawes through both the externalizing and internalizing of the situation. 
 The social establishments’ non-relational rendering of adolescent ideality arrives 
as a floating signifier because it situates the question of care in a discourse of 
externalisation. Recall, that I have insisted that subject formation and reformation occurs 
often unspeakably inside oneself showing it through symptoms such as the way Klawe’s 
breakdown and turmoil with self showed itself through suicidal ideation. The discourse of 
externalisation here is cast in the present and evoked as a question for the subjectivity of 
the educator: As an educator I am split between not being affected by adolescent ideality 
and  rendering ideality irrelevant.  
Just as the limit posed by the other has great significance in the primary 
relationship between the infant and the mother, so too can this significance manifest as an 
ongoing tension in the context of care when we take the limit as the constituent of the 
question of care, not as the limit that needs to be externalized. Psychosocial suppositions 
of intersubjectivity in the context of care provide us a model with which to reflect on the 
current impasse in working with adolescent ideality.  
The controversial case of self-harm wrought most commonly, but not always, 
from suicidal ideation, among adolescents illustrates the collapse of educational space as 
a transitional space. This conflict is further elaborated by translating this conflict into the 
terms of Kuhnian crisis. Problem solving activities, in what Kuhn calls normal science, 
refer to a practitioner’s work of translating the problem in conversation with an exemplar 
that allows the practitioner to arrive at an approximation. The exemplar is an idealization 
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developed and shared by a discipline, an ideality that represents consensus. The crisis, by 
the same token, is the period when the exemplar fails to provide the function of 
approximation. In other words, a crisis comes about when an exemplar does not allow 
one to generate approximation and functions instead as an ideality that imposes itself on 
the problem. During the crisis the exemplar functions, for Kuhn, as an idealization that 
formulates the problem it solves. The exemplar, which is assigned as an approximation 
for similar problems, becomes a defensive structure, an external authority which is an 
obstacle to understanding set against perceiving the structure of the crisis. 
For Kuhn (2012) the subjectivity of the practitioner is where the crisis can be 
pinned down as it expresses the confusion whereby what-we-wish-to-know becomes an 
obstacle to what-we-really-know (171). Kuhn argues that the process of deciding whether 
a practice functions properly or not suffers from a resistance to the perception of 
anomalous experience. This resistance cannot locate the problem that belongs to the 
practitioner and the method. The significance of resistance is foreclosed as it drifts to 
explanations that locate the problem as a problem of precision, therefore a matter of 
maladroit handling of the conflict. What belongs to the practitioner cannot be considered 
because the experience of responding is externalized. Consequently, because practice is 
based on shared conventions around the perception of anomalous experience, it can seem 
like one doesn’t need to be concerned with response to anomalous experience. Kuhn is 
pointed in his insistence, going as far as to say that one’s “perception of his environment 
must be re-educated” (112).  And this is where education provides ground that both blurs 
the question of perception and offers an important potentiality. 
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Both in my encounter with Ruvi and in the self-harm debate adolescent ideality 
expressed as resistance to education and/or the social is what disrupts the educational 
vision of development that is constructed through professional convention and consensus. 
What ideality does is pose the limit of education’s shared convention and by the same 
token expose the limits of the exemplar that education has employed to respond to its 
participants. In the case of the self-harm debate, what Klawes’s situation illustrates is that 
self-harm nullifies the shared successful consensus of the educational institution. 
In pedagogical relationships, “what we wish to know” appears both as an obstacle 
and as a resource for the interplay between “what-we-wish-to-know and what-we-do-
know” (171). A psychosocial view of pedagogical relations and development suggests 
that the work of care resides in this interplay between desire and knowledge where the 
insistence on the subjectivity of the caregiver is integral to the picture of conflict. 
3.4. Ideality in the early relations of care 
Psychoanalytic writing on care holds significant insights into adolescent ideality 
and the limit it poses to the social. It addresses the threat both the adolescent and adult 
experience as an effect of development, and by posing intersubjectivity as a question of 
care. A large body of work theoretically rooted in the psychoanalytic orientation has 
documented analytic constructs related to the adolescent’s situation such as the 
Motherhood Constellation (Stern 1995), attunement (Stern 1998), delinquency (Winnicott 
2013), and object-relations. (Klein 1987; Britzman 2015). Albeit in different ways, the 
constructs conceptualize the question of the limit in the care of infants, children, and 
adolescents that we find in various bodily expressions as intimately linked to interactive 
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experiences (Stern 1990). Psychoanalytic writing insists on intersubjectivity as the 
foundation of care. 
In analytic theory intersubjectivity is “a relationship of mutual recognition—a 
relation in which each person experiences the other as a ‘like subject,’ another mind who 
can be ‘felt with’ yet has a distinct, separate center of feeling and perception” (Benjamin 
2017, 22).  The interests of the analytic studies of Britzman (2015), Stern (1985), and 
Winnicott (2012b) on the significance of relationality and the questions of care and 
response can be traced back to earlier forms of intersubjectivity through a simple 
question: how do we come to know there are other people outside ourselves? 
Psychoanalysis has maintained that the question of care must be considered alongside the 
question of how we come to know other minds as separate yet similar to our own. This 
preoccupation with the kinship of these explorations has influenced the trajectory of 
second and third generation analysts. This negotiation between sameness and difference, 
for Winnicott, wrestles with another question: how do we maintain our minds in the 
presence of others? 
From the very beginning, the body, which depends radically upon the interaction 
between the infant and the mother, is intersubjectivity. At the outset intersubjectivity 
creates the conditions of care and growth for both the mother and the infant, and 
addresses the questions of perception and representation underlying these primary 
interactions. The centrality of care as an intersubjective experience can be seen vividly in 
the pre-linguistic period of infancy when the infant’s “profound immaturity is oriented by 
dependency, helplessness, frustration, and anxiety” (Britzman 2016, 2). The very fact of 
immaturity characterizes the intersubjective quality of care. It is this relationality that we 
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see in the infant’s “fragile efforts to communicate to others a sense of dire need” (Tarc 
2016, 30). “Without words”, Tarc writes, relationality is imprinted in the early 
negotiations with the mother, 
And clinging to the mother’s care, the infant is nonetheless incredibly capable of 
intracommunication that belies empirical determinations of human thought and 
language. Upon birth the infant gives a sense of her instinct to survive through her 
first gasps, cries, and grunts. (31) 
From the very beginning care furnishes  relationality and  the infant’s bodily sensations 
gain emotional value. 
Britzman (2016) notes that the early experience of feeding “gives rise not only to 
its need for the care of others but immediately to feeling-thoughts” (2). Feeding is highly 
complicated for the infant to manage since what sustains the infant through continuation 
is subject to discontinuation. The infant’s solution for dealing with the external world is 
through the mechanism of splitting. Why is there a need for such a solution? The answer 
to this question lies at the centre of the subject of care and is found in later developments 
of life: 
The tiny infant too experiences the force of depression: terrors of not knowing, 
inexplicable situations of mental annihilation, a fall into empty space, and a fear 
of losing a mind that, at first, cannot grasp the cusp of external reality. (Britzman 
2016, 2) 
In rudimentary forms, the infant creates a diverse set of representations concerning the 
experience of feeding because feeding depends on the breast that “conjures a phantastic 
mental state, which forms the basis of [the baby’s] mental life” (Tarc 2016, 31). “The 
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infant's representations are his guide to what he expects”, Stern (1995) tells us, and they 
guide “how he will act, perceive, feel, and interpret in the relationship with his parents” 
(79). To think of these first relations as guides is to enter a relational world where bodily 
experiences are caught up with meaning. For Melanie Klein this relational experience of 
care occurs simultaneously with the act of feeding. Britzman’s (2016) discussion of Klein 
brings us to see the world from the inside out, where, for the infant “apprehending the 
external world, occurs simultaneously with creating the inner world and trying to know 
relies upon unconscious psychical procedures for internalizing, identifying, splitting, and 
projecting into the world of others good and bad bits and pieces of the self” (Britzman 
2016, 4). 
The intersubjective structure of care is as sophisticated for the caregiver as it is for 
the one receiving care. It is through the  importance of care that I assert a psychosocial 
insistence on introducing the subjectivity of the caregiver as always implicated in the 
relations of care (Benjamin 1990; 2017). Stern’s (1995) work on motherhood allows us to 
zoom in on the experience of care through which he shows the significance of the 
caregiver’s subjectivity. Care, for Stern, is intersubjective as from the start and he 
suggests that the work of care creates intersubjective schemas that he refers to as the 
“representational world” (18). 
Stern suggests that care has tremendous impact on the self-representation of the 
caregiver who creates a self that can receive, represent, and respond to the infant’s needs. 
Stern lists the numerous networks of change through which the subject of caregiver 
rewrites so many other dimensions of the self: 
 67 
The networks of schemas that undergo reworking are the mother's self as woman, 
mother, wife, career-person, friend, daughter, granddaughter; her role in society; 
her place in her family of origin; her legal status; herself as the person with 
cardinal responsibility for the life and growth of someone else; as the possessor of 
a different body; as a person "on call" 24 hours a day; as an adventurer in life, a 
creator, a player in evolution's grand scheme, and so on—in short, almost every 
aspect of her life. All these networks are thrown by events into the postpartum 
crucible, potentially to be reforged. (Stern 1995, 24) 
From these many positions Stern suggests a simple point: Being with others involves a 
constellation of experiences such as fears, phantasies, and hopes that are influenced by a 
network of schemes. This is to say, from the get-go, the question of what is out there, 
objectifiable, measurable, and touchable is linked to representations that are themselves 
linked to relationships. 
Stern (1995) suggests that beginning with the birth of the baby, the mother’s 
experience takes on a new position which corresponds to a “new set of action tendencies, 
sensibilities, fantasies, fears, and wishes,” that generate a position for the profound 
experience of caregiving. The constellation made from being with others creates two 
parallel realities. One is the “objectifiable external world,” the other is “the imaginary, 
subjective, mental world of representations” (Stern 1995, 18): 
There is the real baby in the mother's arms, and there is the imagined baby in her 
mind. There is t the parents' experiences of current interactions with the baby but 
also their fantasies, hopes, fears, dreams, memories of their own childhood, 
models of parents, and prophecies for the infant's future. (18) 
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Basing his theories on the analytic tradition, Stern develops the question of care as made 
of the workings of these two parallel realities where the question of care is affected by the 
caregiver’s and infant’s representations of the relationship that take form as “reveries, 
preoccupations, fantasies, and projective identifications” (20). 
In the complex workings of interactive experiences, Stern further emphasizes the 
subjective experience of being with another person: “The interactive experience can be 
real, lived experience, or it can be virtual, imagined (fantasized) interactive experience” 
(19). While the motherhood constellation brings together various relational aspects of 
care, Stern argues that it also wrestles with larger idealities that belong to the cultural 
arena. For instance, Stern notes that in societal idealities such as “the baby is supposed to 
be wanted, [...] culture places a high value on the maternal role, and a mother is, in part, 
evaluated as a person by her participation and success in the maternal role,” these values 
form the basis for a fundamental social injunction; “it is expected that the mother will 
love the baby” (174). This relational matrix is found at the core of the questions of care, 
response, and more generally of experience. The fragility of development depends on the 
infant’s capacity to manage external reality and the mother's reading of “infantile 
expressions” that are overwhelmingly bodily, forming—to borrow Tarc’s (2016) term—a 
kind of “psychical literacy” (33). 
“Psychical literacy,” reading the communication between the infant and the 
mother, hosts misreadings, misperceptions, regressions, and misattunement because the 
work of care is also an emotional experience (Tarc 2016, 33). The experience of being 
with an other for the baby is subject to frequent fluctuations “from feeling good to feeling 
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bad” (Tarc 2016, 38). “These sharp fluctuations,” as Tarc explains, show how the early 
interactive experience of care becomes integral to subsequent readings: 
Objects, others, and the world of the infant’s split mental state greatly impact on 
the mother’s effort to locate the source of the infant’s distress. The mother’s 
“body reading” of infantile expression can become confused and confuse and is 
prone to misreading (Grumet 1988). Unable to gauge or attend to what she thinks 
the infant needs, the mother can regress into her own infancy. With the infantile 
regression, the mother also experiences splitting and unspeakable forms of grief. 
She can also mistake pleasure for pain and pain for pleasure. During this 
overwhelming, confused, perpetually in crisis activity of splitting correspondence 
between self, sensations, and object/other, the inner world is built up as the 
infant’s mechanism for integrating sense is laid down. (Tarc 2016, 33) 
The question of discontinuation is felt in the everyday difficulties of splitting with the 
utmost urgency when we zoom in on the mother-infant relationship. The psychical 
readings that forecast the promise of care with a future relationality for both infant and 
caregiver brings us to the pressing question of the discourse of externalisation. Here these 
literacies are undermined with the mistrust of internal discourse and the new directions it 
could open in a system reliant upon the reaffirming logic of externalization. 
3.5. Ideality as destructive and generative elements in adolescent education  
Psychoanalysis offers the education of adolescents an exemplary account of the 
caregiver’s subjectivity. Britzman (2016) brings us into the provision of care as an 
intersubjective experience. That is to say, the work of receiving, representing, and 
responding involve relying on the self in a way that has to do with learning to read the 
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delegates of ideality and attending to the often emotionally disturbed, anxious, and 
powerless responses of refusal and revolt that split off the adolescent from their 
educational milieu. The inability to work with the symptoms of ideality can be observed 
in disturbed versions of care that are employed as responses to ideality and which appear 
in the form of impositions, such as forced feeding, forced silence, forced self-help or the 
forced-removal of students from educational spaces. These responses risk replicating the 
structure of ideality (Phillips 2011). Attending to symptoms of ideality as intersubjective 
experience translates expressions of ideality into commentaries on the larger social world. 
It is not a coincidence that Kristeva (2007) suggests that the recognition of 
ideality is not reserved for clinical psychological practice. She writes that this internal 
space of radical subject reformation calls upon educators alongside intellectuals, parents, 
and the political sphere. But how does this occur, given that these figures are always 
already configured and reconfiguring in this space by the adolescence? Psychoanalysis 
suggests a particular involvement that Britzman describes as “affected” involvement, 
where the educator working with the adolescent ideality, Britzman suggests, can 
“recognize that the adolescent ideality has a comparable form in her or his ideality of 
education” (Britzman 2016, 80). In a sense we can use the adolescent’s affection with 
figures as a way to break free from the adult sources of her suffering which is perhaps, 
for the adolescent, her or his most important education.  
The educator’s subjectivity is always present in situations of the adolescent’s 
ideality, which has radical consequences for the provision of care. Education must lean 
on its own ideality of care because it serves the function of sustaining continuity for the 
imaginary of care; and yet, adolescent ideality is met with rigid response when it is taken 
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literally, as non-dynamic. In these meetings, response becomes the immanent form of the 
discontinuity of the educational imaginary. In the surprise of meeting Ruvi’s words in my 
classroom presents a wish that I take care with his faltering feelings, betraying a 
resistance toward the social. The failure in my response to Ruvi, where I stated “the 
assigned text does not have to be our favourite text in order for us to have a discussion 
about it, and it can still be interesting,” is not separate from the ideals of education that 
lean on the possibilities of literature and reading unexpected things with others, that a 
pedagogical imagination enlivens. Yet it is at this juncture of educational provision, my 
own subjectivity as an educator, and the ideality of the student that these possibilities for 
caring for each other come apart along the seam where ideality introduces a literal 
relation that is hard to image otherwise in the present. In the classroom, discussion 
continued and we continued to read the text, yet a discontinuity was introduced that treats 
education literally and destroys education as a “potential space” (Winnicott 2012, 55). 
Can the educator’s situation bear the idea of attending to the subjective experience 
of working with adolescents, when this care and attention has been removed from the 
picture of working with adolescent ideality through the discourse of externalisation? The 
subjectivity of the educator is not taken into account as central to working with 
adolescent ideality mostly because adulthood is situated developmentally as the time in 
which one has finished with one’s adolescence. Britzman notes this as a prevalent belief 
in education, the belief that “only the adolescent has psychology and the teacher must 
manage that” (2016, 71). This ideality of education separates the adult from the 
adolescent, pedagogy from psychology, and teaching from learning. Remarking on the 
ideality in education at the heart of these arbitrary distinctions, Britzman speaks to the 
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problems with techniques of care that “promise successful pedagogy and imagine 
psychology as a last resort to explain a student’s failure” (71). 
Further expressions of an absence of recognition of the educator’s subjectivity, for 
Britzman, is the way psychology is situated within the educational system, where the 
“school psychologist” is understood as someone “there to provide an office to send the 
student to for further testing” (71). “It is as if the backward glance of developmental 
theory”, she further emphasises, “is meant to destroy the presence of pedagogy by 
bringing disruptions best left at the classroom door: the messy lives of teachers and 
adolescents, the teacher’s depression, the adolescent revolts needed for becoming, and the 
murky underworld of intersubjectivity” (71). These suppressed revolts lurking in the 
educational imaginary are “urged along” Britzman notes, “by daily routines, by the charts 
of learning objectives, and by the rules of the institution” (71). Where the subjectivity of 
the educator is split from the ideality of the adolescent through the discourse of 
externalisation, the educational institution is also split from the affected position of those 
in the proximity of care. 
To approach imagination in non-dynamic images of adolescent experience only 
offers a partial analysis of the problem, given the fact that the meaning of experience is 
understood only in its context. Britzman suggests holding a unified view of adolescence 
to engage intersubjective experience—whether in the form of writing on adolescence, or 
in working with adolescents face to face—this unified view contains the three facets of 
adolescence that are too often split-off or treated alone as the whole subject: “the actual 
adolescent, the adolescent situation, and the adolescent as figuration in theory” (Britzman 
in press). We can call this view the representational world of adolescent education. In 
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working with adolescents a number of factors are at stake: there is the real adolescent in 
education and there is the imagined adolescent in mind that is informed by the adolescent 
as a figure in contact with one’s own adolescence. The adolescent as figure appears in 
theory as educators are faced with the dilemmas of whether the disturbances that 
adolescent ideality creates should or can be mastered, a question which for Phillips 
(2011) runs the risk of succumbing to responses of “bullying and controlling.” Response 
thus carries a further risk of carrying with oneself “false versions of adulthood” which in 
return replicate the adolescent conditions of “self-harm, drug abuse, harm of others” as 
reflections of the “wish to be more powerful, more effective, more authoritative”  (191-
92). 
In this chapter I have explored the vital role of care through the question of 
institutional, caregiver and adolescent idealities. Thus the questions that have driven this 
work have insisted upon both the vitality of care and the powerful systems and emotions 
that render this work so difficult. Care is the network through which I bring together the 
tension between the real and the imaginary in subjectivity, development and institutional 
life. I have suggested that if we borrow the representational world of the “motherhood 
constellation” we can conceptualize the constellation of care and its provision (Stern 
1995, 3). The response of care refers to the adolescent in care, and to the adolescent as 
imagined and shaped by societal, parental, and educational expectations, fantasies, fears, 
and wishes. It also refers to one’s own adolescence, and our prophecies for the 
adolescent’s future. Care thus places us in the interplay where there is the real action of 
an adolescent being cared for and there is the imagined action of that particular care. 
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Chapter 4: “New Guardians of Youth” 
4.1. Introduction: The destruction of difference 
This chapter begins with the scenes of Peter Huang’s (2017) short film 5 Films 
about Technology. Huang’s film consists of five scenes that portray the pressing 
adolescent preoccupation with technology and the forms it takes in self-other relations 
within social establishments. The film begins with a vignette entitled “Sunday with the 
Girls.” The atmosphere of the first scene is suffused with the worry prevalent in 
educational, parental, and political spaces around the adolescent’s relation to technology: 
We see an incredible craving for virtual relationships at the cost of diminishing real life 
relationships. Set in a restaurant, the first scene opens with three young women in 
focus—each busy with their phones, not talking, and the audible sound of typing. We 
learn with the appearance of the waiter that they have been waiting for their orders. Their 
food arrives; the server places it on the table, and leaves. The forty-second long vignette 
closes with the teenagers taking photos of their meals and posting them to social media. 
The second vignette, “Sunday with Yourself,” centers around two teens and their mother 
and opens with the son viewing the food photo posted in the previous vignette. As he 
browses the photos, the son is asked by his sister and mother to join them on their visit to 
an art gallery. He refuses: “Art Gallery? It sounds boring.” The mother is quick to 
respond: “Playing on your phone sounds boring.” 
The next vignette opens in the art gallery with the Mom on her phone 
complaining about her son being on the phone, likely to the other parent. She speaks as 
she leaves the scene where her daughter appears busy with her phone: “I feel like every 
time I leave him alone all he does is sit there and watch pornography, he has his phone on 
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him all the time. I started getting anxiety every time I walk into his room. I don’t think it 
is normal. I don’t care what you did as a kid.” The third vignette continues with the 
teenage daughter. She is in the gallery taking a selfie and in the background the word 
“Genocide” is written on a work of art. We learn that this selfie goes viral. 
The fourth vignette “FaceTime” opens in a bathroom with a young person on his 
phone reading the news about the viral selfie and posting the comment “you're an idiot,” 
before dropping his phone in the toilet. We then see him running back to his office desk. 
His phone is taken by an office mate and after telling the person on the line “hi, I am 
back,” the office mate says: “Geoffrey? No, he is a dick.” The last vignette, “Geoffrey,” 
opens with a view of a lamp post and a bar entrance with the name: “Man walks into a 
bar.” In quick progression, Geoffrey enters the scene typing on his phone, and unaware of 
the post he is approaching, he walks right into it. 
Peter Huang’s portrait of the image of the adolescent is a composition of various 
dissociations and withdrawals through technology. Technology is found at the centre of 
new formulations of adolescent subjectivity and used to signify what is new about 
adolescent experience. The swiping adolescent, scrolling adolescent, tapping adolescent, 
gaming adolescent, and browsing adolescent are some of the images that circulate in the 
popular imaginary comprising the picture of the ‘dissociated adolescent.’ Douglas 
Rushkoff (2016), a media theorist, describes this baffling phenomenon as a “screenager”. 
The image of the screenager has garnered much attention. It is a cultivation of the 
complaints in contemporary institutions charged with adolescent care. 
The reason for choosing the figure of ‘the screenager’ in my discussion to 
describe the prevalent image of adolescents’ relations to technology is that it signals two 
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failures that Bernard Stiegler (2010) identifies in contemporary social establishments 
involved with the provision of adolescent care. The first failure crops up in institutions of 
care through the formulations of adolescent addiction, withdrawal, and inattention. This 
illustrates how common interpretations of arguments around adolescent subjectivity are 
based on the adolescent’s failure to maintain associations because of the epidemic of 
technology. Technology, in this sense, opens to a fundamental dilemma between the 
individual and society. 
The second form of failure refers to the institutional failure to respond to 
adolescent subjectivity. Bernard Stiegler (2010) pointed to this failure of care by 
describing a shift in contemporary institutional procedures where technology overtook 
the function of care and became the “new guardian of youth” (51). As “the new guardian 
of youth,” technology often signifies an institutional failure (51). The arguments where 
technology signals a lack for institutions of care increasingly propose that there are 
various forms of dissociation in contemporary adolescent experience. By dissociation I 
refer to the pervasive belief that through technology there is a separation from family and 
educational life (but also a retreat into phantasy and interiority). For the adolescent living 
under the regime of this new guardianship of psychotechnology, the contemporary 
adolescent experience is often depicted as one where youth are viewed as being unable to 
converse with each other in public spaces. They are seen as dissociated and distracted 
from the richness of family and educational life, specifically, and social life in general. 
Formulations of dissociation can be found in different forms ranging from obsessions to 
addictions. Explorations of the adolescent experience of technology thus present a 
common argument: technology is what holds adolescents back from getting on with life. 
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With psychoanalytic and sociological ideas about self-other relations, this chapter 
maintains the idea that technology, as “the new malady of the soul,” is first and foremost 
a relational phenomenon that takes us to new forms of earlier struggles of subjectivity 
which stream from the tensions and demands of being in proximity with others (Kristeva 
1995). 
Stiegler characterized these two failures as the destruction of difference. The 
destructive implications of these failures are spatial, temporal, developmental, and 
institutional. This is because these destructive collapses fold over the important space 
lived in the difference between public and private, biology and meaning, adolescence and 
adulthood, and technology and institutional care. In this chapter I use Stiegler’s 
compelling conceptualization of the collapse of difference, not to attempt an answer for 
what youth deserve, but because I think there is something to be retrieved from this 
conceptualisation. 
If psychotechnology, as “the new guardian of youth,” represents a question of 
responsibility, the failure to provide a response of care for the adolescent hence becomes 
the dissociated adolescent (Stiegler 2010, 51). This link between lack of response and 
dissociation ties into a form of collapse that creates devastating anxiety as it generates a 
climate of uncertainty over what youth need. I will be suggesting that the dilemma of 
associated and dissociated adolescents we find in representations, receptions and 
responses of and to adolescent subjectivity is an expression of ambivalence in 
contemporary institutions that are concerned with ethical, educational, and political 
questions of care. 
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In the first part of the chapter, I work with Stiegler’s scholarship on 
psychotechnology and the question of the care of adolescents. Stiegler’s work stages the 
controversy around care in the drama of an unprecedented shift in adolescent 
development. His work is an attempt to answer the question of how technology has 
changed contemporary adolescent subjectivity and responses to it. In contemporary social 
establishments we find two distinct kinds of emphases on the adolescent’s relation with 
technology: association and dissociation. The two distinct emphases on technology refer 
to an insistence that hinges on an imagination around development which strictly links 
the ordinary—if not always the expected development—to the adolescent’s capacity to 
both associate and avoid dissociation. We treat dissociation and disconnection as forms 
of engagement that thwart development and self-other relations. 
Part two of this chapter I return to these emphases through psychosocial views on 
association and dissociation using the works of Winnicott, and Leader, and Goffman. I 
draw on psychosocial suppositions to conceptualize adolescent subjectivity as the 
interplay between association and dissociation, and engagement and disengagement, 
which are all bodily experiences caught up with meaning from infancy onwards. This 
chapter suggests that a psychosocial approach to the image of dissociation and 
adolescence opens onto an overlooked aspect of the body in formulations of adolescent 
subjectivity, technology, and instituted care. I work with the idea that development and 
self-other relations—counter to the omnipresent insistence on connection, attention, and 
association—involve a great deal of disengagement and inattention in constituting the 
interplay between association and dissociation. The aim of this chapter is to re-introduce 
the centrality of this aspect of self-other relations to the picture of how we understand the 
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question of technology and care in contemporary adolescent subjectivity and the work of 
response. 
4.2. “The new guardians of youth” and two directions in the provision of care 
When technology is debated, the first and the most common emphasis 
characterizes the qualities of technology that impede development and self-other 
relations. Among parents, educators, and politicians, adolescent technology is understood 
to be the unprecedented saboteur of development. These concerns are voiced in the 
popular imaginary. A cursory analysis reveals the complexity of the issue. Case in point 
is the CNN opinion piece: “Is social media ruining our kids?” (Potarazu 2015) Eric 
Udorie also suggests “Social media is harming the mental health of teenagers. The state 
has to act.” In the September 2017 Issue of the Atlantic, a Professor of Psychology, Jean 
M. Twenge (2017), wrote a lengthy piece entitled “Have Smartphones Destroyed a 
Generation?” Teachers know, Sherry Turkle (2015) writes, that “students text under their 
desks and take bathroom breaks to respond to messages on their phones, and now the 
phones are even making their way onto the playing fields” (70). Technology is 
understood to be the central flight from development whether it is the educational, 
familial, or the social context. This emphasis brings us to a persistent link between 
association and development. That is to say, the success of adolescent development is 
predicated upon their capacity to associate with others as determined by the adult 
community and world of work. 
Contemporary scholars whose works revolve around dilemmas in adolescent 
experience have pointed out the centrality of technology. Debates on the adolescent’s 
relation to technology draw on an interplay between dissociation and association. There 
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has been growing interest in an adolescent relation to technology characterized by the 
emphasis on its dissociative qualities and this has resulted in formulations around 
obsession, victimhood, isolation, and addiction. It is an emphasis characterised by its 
insistence on a decline in social engagement. 
With relatively less frequency, arguments are also made for the uses of 
technology. These most often revolve around the mobilizing capacity of new media. We 
find these discussions most notably in anthropological studies, under the umbrella of 
digital anthropology, which has opened up traditional views on the uses of technology 
among adolescents to consider their social significance (Hjorth et al. 2017). An 
increasing number of studies maintain favourable arguments for the social dimension of 
technology whether in terms of personal communication or political and social 
engagement. 
The question of youth care and psychotechnology has elicited a wide range of 
responses. A recent study illustrates this battle (Cohen 2016). Fifty-nine percent of 
parents feel their teens are addicted to their devices. Seventy-seven percent of parents 
share the belief that their teens are distracted by their gadgets because of their devices. It 
is reported by the same research that thirty-six percent of parents argue with their teens 
over the use of technology on a daily basis. These questions cover a wide range of 
competing arguments. And worries about teenagers, whether in the classroom or the 
bedroom, touch upon worries over dissociation. 
Stiegler (2010) described these and other controversies around technology in the 
context of adolescence as the “battle for intelligence” (6). Psychotechnology, for Stiegler 
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(2010), refers to industries that range from media to social media and marketing that have 
direct impacts on the mind. This affecting force affects the mind, what Stiegler calls “the 
battle of intelligence,” where the programming industries of new media are replacing—
and simultaneously usurping—the meaningful functions of contemporary institutions 
such as family, school and cultural convention (6). As new guardians, technology appears 
to link directly into the lives of youth in terms of “attracting and retaining attention, in 
order to produce retentions” (36). We stopped educating our children, he maintains, we 
left them instead to their attention capturing devices. Stiegler presses us to consider how 
children have "become nothing more than a brain," having been "stripped not merely of 
critical consciousness but of consciousness itself" (43). He insists that the question of the 
care of youth faces a remarkable challenge in the destruction of attention. He writes that 
“people, having abdicated their majority without being conscious of it, 'give themselves' 
to these industries, or rather, the industries capture them as 'available brain time'" (38). 
Because the social establishments of care weren’t paying attention, the argument goes, 
youth stopped paying attention to the world outside themselves.  
Perhaps the first thing one notices upon reading through the generative work of 
Stiegler is the clarity with which he illustrates the anxiety around care in the circulation 
of the new problem with adolescence as discussed in the popular imaginary. For Stiegler, 
this “new guardian[ship] of youth” belongs to a shift in the larger difficulty regarding 
care (51). It is a shift that indicates the breakdown of faith in modern institutions and, 
Stiegler maintains, causes the collapse of difference between adult and adolescent, order 
and disorder, and development and regression. 
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Stiegler’s accent on dissociation cuts across the institutions and subjects of care 
where the collapse of difference manifests. Across the systems Steigler refers to as 
“programming institutions”—family, education, and law—the underlying quality of care 
is increasingly “undermining the difference between minors and adults” (2). The collapse 
of difference causes pseudo-maturity through “legitimized destruction of the difference 
between minority and maturity” (Stiegler, 41). Stiegler brings together these new 
industries under the term the "attention economy" to emphasize how "DVDs, video 
games, MP3s, and targeted youth websites such as MySpace and Facebook" are 
platforms operating in conjunction. It is at this intersection where Steigler's shift towards 
the destruction of attention can be so clearly observed (36). 
The formulation of care and psychotechnology Steigler presents is representative 
of new studies on contemporary adolescent subjectivity that offer nuanced profiles of 
association and dissociation, and hence extend the possibilities of the kinds of 
relationality we might find in the context of technology and adolescence. With my 
discussion I would like to comment on this split between the two distinct emphases to 
capture the complexity of maintaining the question of involvement as a meaningful way 
to comment on the contemporary failure of involvement that hinges on technology. 
Drawing on Leader and Goffman I show that the capacity for engagement is inextricably 
linked to the capacity for disengagement. This link becomes visible when the use of 
technology is linked to its psychosocial dimension. Scholarship on adolescents’ uses of 
technology continues to omit this fundamental tension that the use of technology 
illustrates. Reframing technology as either obstacle to adolescent development or 
facilitator of development has constituted the main way of responding to pressing 
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questions in the instituted frameworks. More often than not, these studies run the risk of 
holding a simplistic view of subjectivity. These studies imply that in the past adolescents 
just got on with life, attributing associative and disassociative behaviors as unique to 
adolescents or they treat them exclusively as part of the epidemic of technology. This is 
not to say that there was a time where education and the social sphere were free of easily 
accessible flights into states of dissociation, but rather, as I intend to show, that the reason 
technology has proved to be a conundrum for institutions of care is because it touches on 
the relational tension of subjectivity.  
4.3. Subjectivity as the interplay between engagement and disengagement 
Goffman’s (1963) discussion raises questions of learning from the intricacies of 
subjectivity, not by looking at the inappropriate ways that people behave in a given time 
and space, but instead by looking at the ways we successfully handle ourselves.  In 
Behaviour in Public Places Goffman (1963) draws attention to the overlooked quality of 
appropriateness as a way to explicate how the prevalent focus on inappropriateness stops 
us from capturing the richness of ordinary behaviour. The focus on inappropriateness 
refers to the ways we fail to handle ourselves in relationships and it has long been 
established by modern institutions of care as the central way into the dynamic of human 
behaviour. 
For Goffman, psychiatry is the institution par excellence, and he writes on this 
distinction in the handling of behaviour: 
To be sure one part of “collective behavior”—riots, crowds, panics—has been 
established as something to study. But the remaining part of the area, the study of 
ordinary human traffic and the patterning of ordinary social contacts, has been 
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little considered. It is well recognized, for instance, that mobs can suddenly 
emerge from the peaceful flow of human traffic, if conditions are right. But little 
concern seems to have been given to the question of what structure this peaceful 
intercourse possesses when mob formation is not an issue. (4) 
The nuance that Goffman develops is repeatedly illustrated in Peter Huang’s (2017) 
movie where the use of technology becomes the leading way to understand human 
subjectivity and its relational quality. When technology is considered in the context of 
addiction, obsession, and disorder, the turn to relationality is paramount. What is hard to 
see through this focus for Goffman lies in the intrinsic connection developed between 
appropriateness and inappropriateness within the situation so that both behaviours call us 
to consider the nature of involvement allocated to occasioned activities. 
For instance, attending school is an expected part of schooling. And in the same 
way, it is expected of a psychotherapist to ask questions about school of an adolescent 
skipping school. This type of inquiry is an example of involvement that is “intrinsically 
part of the occasion” that legitimates the “occasioned activity” as appropriate (35-6). 
Improper behaviour in occasioned activity takes us to the heart of self-other relations, to 
the dynamic of sociability, and reveals the overt defensive form that proper behaviour 
takes. Skipping school, in Goffman’s words, will reveal the dynamic of skipping and in 
general what schooling might mean for the individual, particularly because of the focus 
on the discontinuity that the inappropriateness of skipping provides. Quite simply, we see 
here the implication of being in a social establishment: attention must be given, 
engagement is obligatory, and yet, so too is disengagement. 
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Goffman points to the underemphasized presence of disengagement that we find 
in expectations around proper behaviour. The example he gives is the banishment of 
lolling and loitering, and the ways that, at certain hours on major streets, police question 
certain people who “appear to be doing nothing” and ask them to “move along” (57). 
Along with the its enforcement, there are many ways that disengagement has gained 
acceptable forms: removing oneself from the work routine through smoke, coffee, and 
washrooms breaks demonstrates some of the ways that the “setting guarantees that the 
participant has not withdrawn from what he ought to be involved in” (58). For Goffman 
this is only one part of the story because in the prevailing picture of self-other relations 
our attention is only given to improper behaviour and dissociation. Goffman takes this 
further: the tendency to set the frame of investigation only around inappropriateness 
diminishes the obligatory part of disinvolvement that we find in all proper self-other 
relations. 
Astonishingly, Goffman illustrates that the proper part of any involvement—what 
we can also call association—holds little significance for understanding the “occasioned 
activity” (36). Involvement does not equal association. Disinvolvement, on the contrary, 
is central to maintaining oneself successfully in self-other relations. It is not only that one 
needs to withdraw from involvement in the situation at hand but that through 
withdrawals, “the individual is required to give visible evidence that he has not wholly 
given himself up to this main focus of attention” (Goffman, 60). He illustrates this point 
by telling a story of a person who slips when trying to catch a bus: 
When a man fully invests himself in running to catch a bus, or finds himself 
slipping on an icy pavement, he may hold his body optimistically stiff and erect, 
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wearing a painful little smile on his face, as if to say that he is really not much 
involved in his scramble and has remained in situationally appropriate possession 
of himself. (60) 
To be situationally appropriate, involvement has to deal with an ongoing question of 
overinvolvement, which therefore requires a certain degree of withdrawal or dissociation 
from the main activity to avoid self-exposure and over-presence (52). This obligatory 
withdrawal can be observed, Goffman notes, in the supply of magazines in waiting 
rooms, or patrons eating alone in restaurants where involvement with food and the 
experience is supplemented by reading a newspaper. Both the activities in these examples 
are now replaced by our preoccupation with phones. 
Defenses are organized in a more rigid manner not only within an occasioned 
situation but also when one is not in the presence of others. Goffman draws on the 
situation of being caught naked. Expectedly, one would hurry to maintain presentability 
to bring an end to the embarrassment. Defense in sociability is organized such that, more 
often than not, individuals maintain their presentability even when alone and in the 
absence of any risk of shame or embarrassment. In other words, one is engrossed in the 
social both with people and when alone. 
Goffman’s conceptualization of interaction has a number of implications for the 
question of adolescent dissociation precipitated through technology and care. Initially, 
dissociation through technology maintains an uncertain quality and its meaning depends 
on the question of how a social establishment understands the ‘engaged’ adolescent. This 
question brings us to the psychosocial supposition that Goffman shares with psychosocial 
theories of self-other relations: what does the other want?  
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Adolescent subjectivity—in all the ways it manifests—belongs to self-other 
relations. Thus the meaning of the adolescent's bodily idioms depend on the 
understanding of a series of tensions at work in all social situations including one that 
Goffman draws particular attention to through the term “aways” (243-44). It is a term that 
underscores the communicative occasion of dissociation. We note that the ways prevalent 
accounts of adolescent dissociation revolve through technology around the formulation of 
“aways” refers, not to the disturbance in self-other relations that stems from the inability 
to maintain appropriate involvement, but rather to the failure to dissociate that is formed 
in ways not immediately available for the social situation (243-44). From the social 
situation Goffman raises the question of the nature of institutional participation: 
[In] organization[s], such as political movements, professional bodies, local 
communities, or families, it has proved very useful to put the question of 
appropriate personal attachment: in what ways is the member obliged to give 
himself up to the organization, and in what ways is he expected to hold himself 
off from it? (244) 
The classical examples of “aways” such as skipping school and dropping out correspond 
to the anxieties over the failure of engagement (243-44). And yet, the conflict at stake is 
much more severe because of the “occult” nature of the adolescent’s relations to 
technology that make the question a matter of dissociation (75). What is at risk in this 
conflict of relations with technology is seen in the representation, reception and responses 
to adolescent experience where the golden rule of “occasioned activity” has been broken 
(35).  “In ordinary life”, Goffman succinctly elaborates, “there is an expectation that all 
situated activity, if not obviously ‘occasioned,’ will have a degree of transparency, a 
 88 
degree of immediate understandability, for all persons present” (76). With technology the 
conflict is not that the adolescent fails to maintain proper engagement, rather the problem 
lies in the failure to maintain a disengagement that is immediately understandable. This is 
what qualifies that relationship as “occult” and fractures the norms of communication that 
render the meetings of everyday life as occasions. 
Goffman draws attention to the intrinsic link between the disturbance and the 
communication of self-other relations. It is expressed through a concern that masks 
misunderstanding. When encountering a person who forms an impression that is not 
readily communicated this confusion is instead expressed through the impression that this 
person’s experience is one of “alienation from activity within the situation” (77). This 
quality of self-other relations is implicitly emphasised in Tamaki Saitō’s (2013) work on 
adolescent social withdrawal as the failure to understand the adolescent point of view. 
While this joins with formulations that approach adolescence through the new dilemmas 
of technology, it does not capture the bodily dimension of technology and the bodily 
idiom. To consider precisely how the image of the dissociated adolescent in the popular 
imaginary can shift from the coordinates of derailment to capture the complexity of 
experience, I turn to the psychosocial anatomy of association and dissociation in self-
other relations. 
4.4. A Psychosocial reading of adolescent dissociation and association 
In the previous section, I explored the implications of the ways the adolescent’s 
use of technology is often framed through the implicit assumption or explicit observation 
that the adolescent is someone who cannot take a break from gaming or texting. This is 
the picture often found in efforts to understand current problems of adolescent 
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experience. To consider the image of the dissociated adolescent through its psychosocial 
dimensions suggests a new orientation that does not limit description, representation, and 
response to either association or dissociation, thus calling the multidimensional aspect of 
the image into account.  The question is, how can new forms of handling the 
transcendence of immediacy in the relationship be extended to the new forms of social 
spaces? 
In psychosocial theory it is not a coincidence to find the expressions associated 
with technology such as texting, swiping, selfies, and other addictions play out in bodily 
terms. These are the terms where developmental representations perceive the body as 
either being derailed or on track. The body is the arena of subjectivity and it always 
signifies relationality—the presence of another. For psychosocial theories bodily 
preoccupations play a key role in the continual struggle of being with others. Long before 
technological preoccupation can even be a part of one’s experience, our bodily 
subjectivity presents a great deal of intersubjective tension that we then find in the 
adolescent’s relation to technology. 
Psychosocial theory situates bodily struggles at the heart of subjectivity where we 
find that from infancy self-other relations are subject to the tensions of being in proximity 
with others. Being in proximity to someone is predicated upon one’s capacity to mediate 
experience and by removing oneself from the situation one can maintain social contact 
with others. In social situations this mediation is established through rituals. Association 
and communication are predicated upon dissociation, wherein encounters without 
technological purposes, Leader (2016) recalls by way of example, “we don’t say ‘let’s 
meet’ but ‘let’s meet for a coffee,’ as if there always has to be something to mediate 
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human relations” (91-2). Being in someone’s proximity involves one’s capacity to deal 
with the demands of relationality. 
Casting backwards from adulthood to the time of infancy we find this very 
tension where mediation overwhelmingly takes bodily form. “Our infancy,” writes 
Britzman (2009), “is made as a relation to others” (29). This can be seen in the numerous 
activities of sucking, smiling, touching, soothing, and the ways babies feed, are consoled 
and console themselves. Relationality is mediated through the infant’s body, grips, looks, 
and spheres of movement, which all extend from the body as the “hybrid element that 
includes the other within it” (Leader 2016, 27). The body signifies a sort of “cohabitation 
of the body” (26). Body is not the hardware for pure biological transmissions; it is always 
the “site of exchange” (25). Leader invites us to observe the dimension of exchange 
through the function of hands: 
Consider the situation. An infant is feeding, with nipple or bottle in mouth, finger 
perhaps in mouth as well, and yet they are simultaneously clasping or rubbing 
some object. How different from a simple model of biological nutrition. We see 
here what psychoanalysis calls “drive”, defined broadly speaking as everything 
that is happening in this scene beyond the level of pure need. (23) 
This refers to relationality from the very beginning that takes the body as a central 
constituent caught up with meaning. Relationality here takes us to the heart of 
subjectivity that plays out in bodily forms. 
The scene of exchange that we can observe with each bodily activity shows how 
subjectivity is subject to a task of regulation. From infancy onwards, we must work to 
handle the tension that emanates from the discontinuous nature of care. When baby is 
 91 
sucking a thumb we can observe how the tension of the young child’s response to 
separation is dealt with through bodily activity where the thumb stands in for the 
discontinuity in care. Bodily sensations are the body returning to itself. Scratching, 
rubbing, sucking, or masturbation to “stimulate the body surface,” are where subjectivity 
as well as the work of care, right from the beginning, mediate this bodily return (Leader 
94). Psychosocial theory suggests that the bodily form of subjectivity reveals a unique 
relational exchange. 
The newborn presents the ways bodily experience takes on the task of mediation 
and carries out relational transactions. In proximity of the mother, is the revolving of the 
infant’s experience. When we look at the expressions of subjectivity in infancy we see 
that looking, crying, grasping, pointing, and reaching, are the central to the work of care. 
In the signs and interpreted from infancy’s early expressions are the communications of 
the infant’s experience. Yet too often, the question of what kind of relational work is 
going on here is overlooked because infants are understood to be limited to the 
immediacy of their surroundings, therefore thought to be lacking relational, spatial, and 
temporal dimensions of experience (Gopnik 2009). 
The transaction that bodily subjectivity presents, gives us a different account of 
the subjectivity which is at the heart of discourses of association and dissociation, and 
which permeates accounts of the adolescent’s use of technology. We can look at Leader’s 
(2016) examination of hands where the activities of hands illustrate the struggle of 
mediation: 
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Confronted with the bodily sensations that the infant has to deal with, the hand is 
a vector out. As it moves from grasping to reaching it situates its aims outside the 
contours of the body. It allows a movement away. (93) 
Leader suggests hands are the first way out of the question of sensation. It is for the same 
reason that the psychoanalytic literature interprets various forms of preoccupation with 
the body as expressions of subjectivity and care made through the caregiver's devotion to 
the preoccupations of infancy, childhood and adolescence. Leader’s discussion aptly 
extends psychoanalytically and captures how the ways hands return to bodies in the 
forms picking, scratching, plucking, scraping, or rubbing are integral to how one's 
subjective experience is directed towards a relational situation. 
Our return to infancy and the mother-child relationship brings us to the question 
of autonomy, which is inherently linked to the question of the body. “During our first 
year of life, the hand must liberate itself from its dominion by the mouth,” writes Leader 
(2016), “a process that the early researchers referred to as the quest for ‘autonomy’” (15). 
The transitional object carries out this very function. “In a space where the child and the 
mother’s body may be confusingly caught up with each other”, Leader (2016) points out 
that, “the transitional object offers a point of consistency: neither her nor me” (27). 
Because subjectivity is constituted through responses to the fundamental experience of 
caring and being cared for, the ways that these experiences are mediated take bodily 
forms: The conflicts of subjectivity thread through bodily sensations that link to how our 
bodies are handled, how needs are mediated, and how they are experienced. 
There is a balancing that goes on between the mother and the baby where body, 
need, and experience form a constellation of relationality where the meeting of self and 
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other is not seamless but finds contact in the tension of transition. Paul Verhaeghe (2014) 
has described this interplay as the “balance of tensions”: 
The earliest stages of this process are plain: a baby cries because of its wet nappy, 
and, as if by magic, Mummy appears. She makes comforting noises and asks, ‘Do 
you need a clean nappy then?’ She talks to the baby in a special, high-pitched 
voice, and exaggerates her facial expressions. The importance of this simple 
interaction, repeated in a hundred different ways, is enormous. We learn what we 
are feeling and, more generally, who we are, by the other showing up. (9) 
“The balance of tensions,” is described as being: “torn between the urge to merge with 
and the urge to distance ourselves from the other” (10). The situation of care evolves 
from less complex statements such as “are you hungry?” or “Do you need clean diapers?” 
to more complex expressions like that of being a good boy or girl, or articulating how bad 
it is to bite another person, and how to feel when one toddler bites another. 
The relentless activities of providing care reveal the questions of the unknown 
nature of bodily expressions that urge on the work of theorising situations of care—and 
yet, response persists as if the experience is known and expressions are understood. If we 
go back to the discourses of association and dissociation, what is missed in this split is 
the bodily struggle of subjectivity, which through splitting becomes limited to 
impulsivity. The emergence of the mobile phone as a form of hand technology has paved 
the way for the focus on the constantly available communicative function. Social 
commentary has targeted the ways smartphones occupy time at the dinner table, insert 
absent conversation in present interactions, perpetuate online debate with meaning 
elusive to the external world beyond the web, and distract from the immediate obstacles 
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and dangers of walking, driving, and doing. This is in chorus with Peter Huang’s (2017) 
cinematic vignettes, where the social worries over the ways smartphones fail as devices 
designed to enable communication. 
For Leader, technology in our hands is the new mediator, as it interposes in social 
relationships as the mediator of bodily functions. Goffman’s and Leader’s views on self-
other relations shed light on a highly significant aspect of social contact. The ways that 
we come to inhabit our bodies engenders a relentless relational tension that reverberates 
through our mental and bodily activities as integral to all our activity in each given social 
situation. The increasing emphasis on adolescents’ use of technology as an expression of 
either dissociation or association misses this central activity. It is the activity of finding a 
point of consistency where the tension of being in a social situation can be held 
concurrently with its demands without withdrawing from the social situation or being 
invaded by external reality. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The relational perspective on how we come to be with others allows us to reflect 
on the tendency to limit the question of adolescent dissociation through technology and to 
open up ways to respond to adolescents differently.  This brings us back to the point of 
departure. Stiegler’s (2010) intriguing observation that technology has become “the new 
guardian of youth” captures the shift towards an unprecedented preoccupation, which 
both emphasises the alienation of adolescents from social establishments, and 
conceptualizes the ways this emphasis is understood solely as a mode of dissociation 
from self-other relations (51). I have emphasized how disconnection and dissociation are 
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central activities of subjectivity which provide clues to how one deals with the question 
of being in the proximity of others. 
In this chapter I argued there are two reasons the interplay of association and 
dissociation requires particular attention in the context of the adolescent’s relation to 
technology. Accounts of association and dissociation don’t engage with the relational 
quality of the tension in the adolescent’s relation to technology and thus, this tension, as a 
vehicle that carries messages about the question of subjectivity created through 
intersubjectivity, has larger implications for the social establishments of care. 
We are not only accessing the dynamics of self-other relations missing from the 
current emphasis on association and dissociation, we also return in search of a link to the 
larger question of care: In what way is the question of what the other wants implicated in 
the creation of these forms of association and dissociation? This is a dynamic I elaborate 
on in the following chapter There I explore ways of thinking about the provision of care 
to ask after the ways the subjectivity of the caregiver is implicated in the recourse to the 
adolescent body. Whether it is an educational, clinical, legal, or parental engagement with 
adolescent experience, explorations of the subjectivity of the caregiver enable us to 
consider how care animates to the question of how the body is inhabited. 
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Chapter 5: What should we do with the adolescent body? The madness of care 
between being a body and having a body 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The title of this chapter is a play on the title of Catherine Malabou’s (2008) book 
What Should We Do With Our Brain? Malabou points to a new relation to the brain as a 
response to the question of ‘what the brain is about’. This response is an emblem of the 
way the body prevailingly serves to explain the workings of the brain and thus is 
characterized by a commitment to the biologization of psychological disturbance, the 
discourse of exceptionality, and the political discourse of social utility. 
This characterization of the social body is a response to the rigidity with which 
the brain is situated as an all-embracing term and central pillar in the provision of care. 
Malabou’s revision, which moves us from the question of ‘what the brain is about’ to the 
question of ‘what do we do with our brain,’ points to its “definitional magma” (14). She 
points to how the very constitution of the brain is linked to historical disciplinary 
involvement and Malabou’s contextualisation teases out how disciplines of thought 
contribute to the modalities of self that are linked to rigid conceptualizations of the brain 
as non-dynamic. There are consequences to focusing on ‘what the brain is about’ and 
Malabou points in particular to the consequence of subjectivity being equated with the 
brain. The revised question ‘what should we do with the brain’ disperses the rigidity that 
equated subjectivity to a non-dynamic conception of the brain, and yet this inquiry still 
recognizes the centrality of the brain in a relational context.  
In this chapter I work with the guiding question ‘what should we do with the 
adolescent body?’ In the preceding chapters I have drawn on the central modes of 
representation, reception, and response in contemporary adolescent subjectivity. In this 
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chapter I aim to develop a distinction and theorize movement between the questions 
‘what the adolescent body is about’ versus ‘what should we do with the adolescent body’ 
to untangle the literalization of the adolescent body that appears in contemporary 
institutional care in the form of a conceptual difference between the adolescent “as being 
a body” versus the adolescent “as having a body.” Through this discussion I seek to 
sketch out some of the ways that the position of “critical detachment”—often understood 
to have epistemological privilege—is taken up in responding to adolescent experience, its 
representation, and reception (Felski 2015, 6). This position is linked to the interplay of 
care that I describe, working with a psychoanalytic formulation, as differing between 
conceptions of the adolescent ‘as being a body’ and  ‘as having a body.’ 
The difference between the adolescent as being a body versus the adolescent as 
having a body refers to the interplay between how one comes to inhabit a body and to 
what extent inhabiting a body is determined by relations formulated here through the 
psychosocial supposition that there is no given for how to inhabit a body. The question, 
“what the adolescent body is about,” denotes the common conflation of the adolescent 
with being a body that signals a literalizing of the body. In this chapter I want to draw 
attention to a particular aspect of this literalization through what Rita Felski (2015) calls 
critical detachment (6).  
Critical detachment conveys a particular approach to subjectivity that frames its 
relation to experience as “what the subject is about” by way of an assumed difference 
from the way it is interpreted, responded to, and represented. The literary 
conceptualization of critical detachment signals a position where interpretation is linked 
to an idea of reading for times when one is not affected by the work of interpretation. The 
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concept suggests an objective position for the self to be free from the affect of the 
experience of responding. Critical detachment is found in responses to adolescent 
experience linked to an ideology of internalization that positions providing care and the 
experience of receiving care as irrelevant to the exchange.  Felski’s (2015) critique of the 
ideality of reading as critical detachment  assumes an unaffected position corresponds to 
the assumption that responsiveness can be freed from the experience of reading. This 
interplay, from the psychoanalytic perspective, articulates the difficulty of subjectivity, of 
how inhabiting a body is not a given, and is predicated upon the way it is approached. 
With a turn to two literary figures which present us the interplay of being a body 
versus having a body in conversation with the dilemmas of care, I discuss the 
implications of considering the question of “how we read and to what end” for the ways 
adolescent experiences are interpreted (Felski 2015, 6). This turn will help us address the 
intimate link between the articulations of subjectivity for which bodily expressions 
become difficult for those involved in and within questions of representation, response, 
and reception. 
The questions of the body, of subjectivity, of the struggles of being in proximity 
with others, and of care become particular preoccupations in the narratives of two 
particular literary figures: “Bartleby” in Herman Melville’s (2009) famous story 
“Bartleby the Scrivener,” and Herculine Barbin (Foucault 2010) read through her found 
memoir. In Melville’s work, these preoccupations are powerfully depicted through 
Bartleby’s refusal of speech, and in Herculine Barbin’s memoir narrative of her 
experience, which in different ways depict what Borges (1999) called, in his comment on 
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Bartleby, “fantasies of behaviour and feeling[s]” (246). Both figures evoke powerful 
fantasies over their behaviours, care, and response. 
My interest here in Melville’s story is best illustrated in reference to Jorge Luis 
Borges’s prologue to the short story. Borges gives a curious description of Melville’s 
story, drawing on Kafka as an entryway into the tale of Bartleby. Kafka’s work, Borges 
observes, “casts a curious ulterior light on ‘Bartleby’” (246). He reads “Melville’s story 
[as] defin[ing] a genre which, around 1919, Franz Kafka would reinvent and further 
explore: the fantasies of behaviour and feeling[s]” (246). Each character presents and 
illustrates the interplay between the adolescent having a body and being a body. The 
dilemmas in Herculine Barbin and Bartleby zoom in on different aspects of the tension 
between the experience of inhabiting a body and caring for a body. In Bartleby, the 
narrator generates responses in an effort to make sense of Bartleby's motivations and 
needs, and doing so portrays the experience of the provision of care. The figure of 
Herculine Barbin, on the other hand, presents us a depiction of the relationality in the 
struggle of inhabiting a body. 
A move to literature through an analytic reading method allows us to engage with 
the juncture between the work of care and the experience of subjectivity and offers us a 
glimpse of the loss of the emotional world in claims of critical detachment. The duality of 
treating the adolescent as being a body and as having a body illustrates both why the 
particular formulation of the adolescent as a body becomes a plausible place for the 
externalization of the experience of care and why considering expressions of adolescent 
subjectivity in the work of care offer us a new picture of how relationality is embedded in 
the struggle to inhabit a body. 
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5.2. “I would prefer not to”: the fantasies of behaviour and feeling, or the limits of 
reading 
Herman Melville’s (2009) 1853 work, “Bartleby the Scrivener” is narrated by an 
unnamed senior lawyer as the story of his experience in a series of events upon the 
recruitment of a law clerk, Bartleby.  Bartleby's single mode of communication response 
to the lawyer's request for copy: “I would prefer not to” (12). The various responses that 
this communication evokes in the narrator is the subject of my discussion. The evocations 
that Bartleby’s response elicits illustrate what I would like to emphasize as the centrality 
of “fantasies of behaviour and feeling” in understanding the work of care and the 
expressions of subjectivity when it is equated with critical detachment (Borges 1999, 
246). 
The narrator of “Bartleby the Scrivener” is an elderly lawyer, “a man who, from 
his youth upwards, has been filled with a profound conviction that the easiest way of life 
is the best,” and he has lived in “ordinary contact with what would seem an interesting 
and somewhat singular set of men, of whom, as yet, nothing [..] has ever been written—
[by which he] mean[s] the law copyists, or scriveners” (Melville 2009, 1).  Bartleby, the 
strangest of copyists, is “more a man of preferences than assumption” (32). Bartleby joins 
a team of copyists, who go by the names, Nippers, Turkey, and Ginger Nut, “whose 
names have been mutually conferred to embody their characteristics” (Bollas 1974, 402). 
What Borges (1993, 246) describes as “the fantasy of behavior and feelings” is at work as 
the narrator describes Bartleby as “pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn,” 
presumed qualities which make the narrator glad for his temperament, qualities that 
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“might operate beneficially upon the flighty temper of Turkey, and the fiery one of 
Nippers” (Melville 2009, 10). 
Upon his employment, Bartleby scrupulously carries out “an extraordinary 
quantity of writing” to an extent that he appears as someone famished for “something to 
copy”(11). Bartleby gorges himself on the documents with “no pause for digestion” is a 
noteworthy detail as the dreary work of copying in such a scrupulous way doesn’t escape 
the narrator’s attention (11). The image of careful and hardworking Bartleby is disrupted 
on the third day when he is summoned by the narrator in the hopes that “Bartleby might 
snatch it and proceed to business without the least delay” (12). In answer to the narrator’s 
request Bartleby's iconic response enters the story: “I would prefer not to” (12). 
Bartleby's first couple of utterances of “I would prefer not to” baffle the narrator, 
and yet his reception of these statements hovers between knowing what Bartleby is doing 
and not knowing how to make sense of his refusal (12). “[There] was something about 
Bartleby,” describes the narrator, “that not only strangely disarmed me, but in a 
wonderful manner touched and disconcerted me” (14). As the storyline unravels the 
curious patience of the narrator begins to turn into a metallic urgency to get Bartleby to 
work.  Yet the narrator’s insouciance persists. He consults with the other clerks and 
inquires into formulating a reason for Bartleby’s odd preference. With no concrete 
evidence to justify Bartleby’s refusal, the lawyer forms another judgment: “For the most 
part, I regarded Bartleby and his ways. Poor fellow! thought I, he means no mischief; it is 
plain he intends no insolence; his aspect sufficiently evinces his eccentricities are 
involuntary” (16-17). 
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Attempts up to this point to make sense of the situation prove futile, they neither 
generate explanations that satisfy the lawyer, nor do they alter the situation. With no 
visible change or any clue as to why Bartleby continues to refuse to work, the lawyer 
creates another interpretation of the situation: 
I became considerably reconciled to Bartleby. His steadiness, his freedom from 
all dissipation, his incessant industry (except when he chose to throw himself into 
a standing revery behind his screen), his great stillness, his unalterableness of 
demeanor under all circumstances, made him a valuable acquisition. (20) 
On a Sunday the narrator visits his law firm and finds Bartleby in the office 
refusing his boss entry to the premises. While the narrator is browbeaten by the dictates 
of Bartleby in “order[ing] him away from his own premises,” he is nonetheless attentive 
to Bartleby’s candid refusal: 
Was anything amiss going on? Nay, that was out of the question. It was not to be 
thought of for a moment that Bartleby was an immoral person. But what could he 
be doing there—copying? Nay again, whatever might be his eccentricities, 
Bartleby was an eminently decorous person. He would be the last man to sit down 
to his desk in any state approaching to nudity. Besides, it was Sunday; and there 
was something about Bartleby that forbade the supposition that he would by any 
secular occupation violate the proprieties of the day. (22) 
Upon failing to gain entrance to his property, the narrator returns later to his office and 
enters this time “without hindrance” (22). A cursory investigation of the scene conjures 
up all the necessary clues for the conclusion that Bartleby “has been making his home 
here, keeping bachelor's hall all by himself” (22). This picture evokes powerful fantasies 
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of feelings and behaviour in the narrator in which Bartleby comes across as “a wreck in 
the mid Atlantic,” as “a sort of innocent and transformed Marius brooding among the 
ruins of Carthage,” Bartleby's body seems “laid out, among uncaring strangers, in its 
shivering winding-sheet” (23). 
Bartleby’s idiosyncratic response makes its way of influence into other clerk’s 
responses and the story takes a turn as the narrator’s first responses of “pure melancholy 
and sincerest pity” become “merged into fear, that pity into repulsion,” and as pity failed 
to lead to “effectual succor,” “common sense bi[d] the soul be rid of it” (24-5). The 
smorgasbord of evocations leads to the narrator's first solution which entails terminating 
Bartleby's employment. Bartleby’s refusal of this decision evokes irritation in the 
narrator: Bartleby’s “perverseness seemed ungrateful, considering the undeniable good 
usage and indulgence he had received” (26). Like an exasperated parent trying to 
persuade a child to stop refusing to eat the narrator makes another attempt: “Say now, you 
will help to examine papers to-morrow or next day: in short, say now, that in a day or two 
you will begin to be a little reasonable:—say so, Bartleby”. Bartleby doesn’t hesitate to 
push-the-button with his “mildly cadaverous reply”: “At present I would prefer not to be 
a little reasonable” (27). 
The expression, “I would prefer not to” becomes the single mode of responding to 
the demands of the boss, the narrator’s inevitable maladroit handling of the situation 
leads to dismay (27). Having failed both in his attempts to expel and help Bartleby, he 
resorts to the solution of moving his business out of the building.  And yet, Bartleby 
continues to stay. A new tenant takes over the building and Bartleby is forcibly removed 
and sent to prison where he refuses to eat or drink and consequently wastes away. The 
 104 
narrator mentions a rumour he hears sometime after Bartleby's death about Bartleby 
working in the dead letter office in charge of cremating undeliverable mail. 
The affective power of Bartleby’s story can be explained through a curious 
situation: The figure of Bartleby has long since become an easily recognizable figure 
despite the fact that his unusually enigmatic response doesn’t necessarily reveal anything 
about Bartleby’s motivation. In other words, it is difficult to describe the figure of 
Bartleby without getting caught in speculation on the unfathomable meaning of the 
expression “I would prefer not too” (27). As readers, we struggle throughout the story 
with the question of what sense to make of Bartleby's enigmatic response as we observe 
the narrator’s recourse to a wide range of speculations over the meaning of Bartleby's 
preference. The question of ‘what to do with Bartleby’ becomes a progressively more 
difficult question to sustain, a difficulty progressively replaced by explanations and 
theories for ‘What Bartleby is about’. 
This tension plays out curiously in the secondary scholarship engaging the novel. 
To an extent literary criticism of Bartleby can be read as an enactment of the problem that 
the story represents. The scholarship is animated by analysis on the meaning of 
Bartleby’s evocative response: “I would prefer not to” (27). The literature on the meaning 
of Bartleby's response is vast, and is described by one critic (McCall 1989) as “The 
Industry of Bartleby”.  The figure of Bartleby has been used to illustrate the dynamic of 
work-life (Poore, 2013), youth revolts (Dilgen, 2012; Castronovo, 2014), in the contexts 
of refusing to eat (Phillips, 2001), and psychosomatic communication (Bollas 1974). The 
ambiguity and the impact of the declarative “I would prefer not to” perplexes the reader 
along with the narrator (27); this story leaves the reader in the midst of formulating the 
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disturbing quality of  Bartleby’s “occult involvement” that refers to an individual activity 
that is perceived to be “tasklike” and yet “not ‘understandable’ or ‘meaningful’” 
(Goffman 1963, 75). This transposition is noteworthy. In the way Bartleby's refusal 
compels the narrator to understand, formulate, and respond to Bartleby's motivations, so 
too has this narrative precipitated a comparable enthusiasm, with competing arguments, 
in the literature concerning what the story, and primarily what Bartleby, is all about. Our 
reading illustrates the difficulty of ‘not getting caught’ in Bartleby’s idiosyncratic 
statement, but at the same time being caught by the narrator’s recurrent captivation of it. 
5.3. What happens when negative inscription is not necessary 
The memoir penned by Herculine Barbine provides a difference sense of 
entrapment that has to do with testifying to her situation and the book also includes a 
dossier reports and press coverage. This archive is brought to light by Michel Foucault 
(2010) who draws on a different series of events to assemble the story. Barbine was born 
on November 8, 1838 in the village of Saint Jean d'Angely, in France. Her father died 
soon after she was born. Her father’s death resulted in a state of deprivation which led to 
her placement in an orphanage for girls, marking the beginning of her time in educational 
institutions, where she spends most of her life, first as an orphan, then as a student, and in 
the end as a student teacher. When we read Barbin’s memoir alongside the medical 
documents included by Foucault we find the excruciating state of mind that Barbin 
experienced. She was in a “perpetual crisis that culminated in her suicide” (Butler 1990, 
125). A number of confessional encounters with a doctor and a priest that lead to 
Barbin’s forced removal from her position illustrate for us two struggles at stake.  The 
first is Barbin’s struggle to inhabit her body within social institutions seen in the way 
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Barbin’s “sexual disposition is one of ambivalence from the outset, that h/er sexuality 
recapitulates the ambivalent structure of its production” (Butler 1990, 127). The second is 
the struggle of the social institution. As Barbin’s confessional encounters precipitate 
institutional ambivalence, we see the institutional struggle to make sense of Barbin’s 
sexuality that recasts the institution’s understanding of its own image.  
A nun working in the orphanage notices Herculine’s brightness early on and she 
is placed at Ursuline Convent, a boarding school for girls until her First Communion in 
1853. Schooling grants some room for Herculine’s experience which was at odds with the 
milieu of her time: “a woman with masculine features, [..] tender and educated, writer 
and a school master” (Gozlan 2014, 35). In her schooling years Herculine forms 
relationships with other girls where “sexuality is atmospheric, both absent and intensely 
present” (35). This is also a time when Herculine is preoccupied with her sexuality and 
her physiology. “My condition, although it did not present any anxieties,” she writes 
early on, “was no longer natural” (19). Near the end of her memoir Herculine describes 
her sexuality as “the struggle of nature against reason” (Foucault 1980, 100).  
At the age of seventeen, due to her success as a scholar, Herculine was sent off to 
Le Chateau to study to be a teacher. Herculine experiences intense physical pain which 
lead to a number of encounters. At first she was met with shock by the doctor and given 
advice to leave the school. Next there is a confession which leads to another medical 
examination which resulted in the decision to terminate her job. Herculine leaves 
promptly for Paris for a medical surgery to mark “the true sex” of Herculine Barbin 
(Foucault 2010, vii). Herculine describes this decision as “finally escaping from that kind 
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of ridiculous inquisition of which I saw myself the object” (93). In 1868, Herculine 
commits suicide. 
Reading her story chronologically, we find three moments in which Herculine 
attempts to resolve the conflict of her physiology, which becomes increasingly more 
difficult to bear. The first attempt takes place while Barbin is on vacation with boarding 
school: “This mental agony was later joined by horrible physical sufferings. They were 
such that I believed more than once that I had reached the end of my existence. They 
were nameless, intolerable pains that, I learned afterwards, constituted an imminent 
danger” (51). On this vacation Barbin confesses her suffering to a missionary Monk. 
Barbin is advised by the Monk that the safest course is to withdraw and become a nun 
rather than become subject to suffering sexuality wrought by physiology: “My plan was 
to unburden myself frankly to this unknown confessor and to await his judgment! You 
can imagine the astonishment, the stupefaction, that my strange confession caused 
him!!!” (61). The missionary monk told her she could “not keep [her] present position, 
which is full of danger” (62). 
The second encounter takes place when Herculine’s physical pain intensifies. Her 
suffering leads to a medical examination by a village doctor. Madame P. and the doctor 
who are brought this knowledge come to an agreement that the solution lies in simply 
burying the matter. Barbine’s own speculation on the matter afterward concentrates on 
her surprise in the discovery and consequently on the end of her own “naivete”, the 
adjective she uses to describe the response she received:  
[s] he was afraid of a scandal that might harm the respectability of her house and 
compromise her interests. Then, she had boundless trust in me. To accept the 
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insinuations of the doctor was to doubt her daughter at the same time, and her 
pride rebelled at that idea. She drove her naïveté so far as to believe that I was 
completely ignorant of my position … That was absurdity pushed to the last 
degree! ! ! I have never been able to understand how a woman of her age, of her 
experience, could preserve such an illusion! (70) 
The third encounter takes place amidst a further intensifying of her physical 
suffering that leads Barbin to request to be examined by the doctor of a bishop, after a 
full confession. The interrogations and examination that follow result in a radical 
consequence: her civil status is rectified, Alexina Barbin is changed to Abel Barbin and 
exiled to Paris from the province where she lives. “This inevitable outcome, which I had 
foreseen, had even desired,” writes Barbin, “terrified me now like a revolting enormity” 
(79). Upon the revelation of the tantalizing new identity, the town of L was in a state of 
shock, and here we find a reaction familiar to matters concerned with the adolescent 
body: 
Some people went so far as to accuse my mother of having concealed my true sex 
in order to save me from conscription. Others saw me as a real Don Juan, saying 
that I had brought shame and dishonor everywhere, and had profited brazenly 
from my situation in order to engage secretly in love affairs with women who had 
been consecrated to the Lord. I knew all that, and I was not in any way upset by it. 
(90) 
The call to address that drives our responses to the ambiguities of self-other 
relations is laced with fragments of transference. We can think about Bartleby’s 
statement “I would prefer not to” as meaning many things, just as Herculine’s negation, 
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“I was not upset by it.” What makes these responses enigmatic is that the reader is placed 
into the position of a helpless adult. This paradoxical relationality is what Britzman 
(2006) calls “the composition of fact with transference” (161). Each response the narrator 
creates involves a ‘theory’ about what Bartleby is doing each time he states his 
preference not to do something. To put it another way, whatever the thing may be that 
Bartleby prefers not to do, it cannot be thought separately from what the lawyer prefers 
him to do. As for Herculine, there is the negation and how it conceals her experience. 
Responses to both Herculine and Bartelby illustrate how projective theorizing is at stake 
in responses that receive, represent, and meet with experience. 
Another curious quality runs across the short story and the memoir.  In both 
situations the absence of meaning is created by the insertion of a negative. What kind of 
meaning can a negative inscription carry for the situation of response beyond its purely 
disciplinary quality? This is highly significant because the narrator in Bartleby and the 
people in charge of Barbin give the impression, more than anything, that they are baffled 
by the situations they encounter. In both cases, responses to each character follow an 
uncannily parental line of inquiry that aligns with what psychoanalysis calls negative 
inscription (Leader 2011; Freud 1952; Verhaeghe 2014). This term refers to the most 
basic parental activity of prohibition, which is also a fundamental activity of care at the 
institutional level. Negatively inscribing what it means to inhabit a body signals, 
simultaneously, the maddening quality of care, linked, as I show in the next section, to 
the collapse between conceptions of the adolescent as being a body and as having a body. 
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5.4. Negative inscription and the question of the limit 
The responses that drive both narratives ilustrate central strands of experience in 
the provision of care. When we look at the ways that Barbin and Bartleby are received, 
represented, and responded to we find that what runs through both narratives is negative 
inscription. That is to say, we find that the provision of care is predicated upon what will 
not be tolerated in relation with the very things that allow one to be a clerk or a teacher. 
In sync with Bartleby's idiosyncratic refusal, the responses from his boss are filled with 
projections of what being a clerk is bound to do, and by the same token, lead to a gradual 
inscription of negativity onto Bartleby. The narrator tells Bartleby he is not supposed to 
do certain things and Bartleby replies instead “I would prefer not to” (Melville 2009, 27). 
In a number of ways, the narrator is telling Bartleby why he shouldn't do what he is 
already doing so that Bartleby might be allowed to keep his position. Refusing to 
cooperate, not doing his share of the copying, and staying at the office, are among the 
many expressions of negative inscription that are coded in the responses of the narrator. 
There is a recurrent insistence by Bartleby’s boss to formulate how Bartleby can 
keep his position, as the inscriptions, we are told, are “made according to common usage 
and common sense” (Melville 2007, 14). This process is exemplified early in the story 
when the narrator tries to convey the nature of negative inscription to Bartleby: “It is 
common usage. Every copyist is bound to help examine his copy.” Bartleby’s refusal is 
beautifully characterized as coming in “some unprecedented and violently unreasonable 
way,” its impact is described as a consequence rather than expression of the crisis of 
ideality, and it is the narrator who is beginning to “stagger in his own plainest faith” 
(Melville 2009, 14). The sustained ineffectiveness of the negative inscription makes two 
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things impossible simultaneously: Bartleby is not, as we learn, able to have a professional 
body, and his boss is unable to keep his position as a boss. 
The inscription of negativity crops up as a dilemma throughout the memoir of 
Herculine Barbin as well. The memoir draws on a great deal of ordinary experiences 
from Barbin’s early years, especially the years of her adolescence at a girl’s school where 
the ordinary experiences of growing up come in the form of bodily sensations, sexuality, 
and anxiety. The memoir vouchsafes a parade of bodily sensations right from the get-go: 
“vast courtyards with children and sick people, silent corridors disturbed by moans,” 
kisses, touches, leanings (5). With the bodily changes of adolescence already set in, 
Herculine is more conscious of her own body. “My condition,” Herculine narrates in her 
seventeenth year, “although it did not present any anxieties, was no longer natural” (19). 
Herculine’s response is embedded with the inscription of negativity that allows her to 
knot her bodily experience to language. A number of changes take place simultaneously, 
bodily changes, educational changes, and her ways of relating to other people become 
infused with many forms of urgency stemming from what Herculine describes as 
“incredible sensation” (32). 
Even prior to the medical intervention with its juridical hinge, imposing the 
negative inscription by which it conditioned the only way for Herculine to have a body, 
literally (you cannot be called Herculine, you cannot wear this, you cannot do that), we 
find various other forms of negative inscription on different levels. Consider some of the 
major events of the memoir: Sarah and Herculine were not to sleep together; Herculine 
was not to kiss Sara; and, the last major encounter with the Bishop can easily be 
imagined as a verbal imposition of the inscription of negativity. 
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What does the inscription of negativity entail? In psychoanalytic work, negative 
inscription refers to an activity that is at the centre of care relations. Growing up, or to be 
more precise, socialisation, is predicated upon entering into a shared reality through the 
symbolic order that organizes reality through the introduction of discontinuities such as 
divisions and contrasts. In the process of symbolisation, language introduces negativity, 
which simultaneously creates our worlds and at the same creates “distance from the 
supposed immediacy of experience” (Leader 2011, 51). The process is embedded in the 
experience of growing up. “We introduce discontinuities into the world”, Leader 
explains, “where no such constructs may necessarily exist, and through this process, our 
reality becomes meaningful and differentiated. High/Low, Earth, Sky, or Bear/Eagle 
could all act as parts of a code in different cultures to convey an identical message” (51). 
This activity corresponds to the basic principle of the negative inscription in 
speech which allows children to “become social beings” (52). As the symbolic operates 
gradually, reality becomes “an out-of-body experience” (52). The symbolic realm enters 
through the organizing function of language. “The more that the body is drained in this 
way”, writes Leader, 
the more the world becomes liveable. Children become interested in their 
surroundings through equating these with bodily functions: a dripping tap can be 
fascinating for a child as it evokes the penis, a hole on a wall captivating because 
it seems like a mouth. Interest in the world can also mean terror, if the equations 
the child makes do not become progressively spread out and symbolized; without 
this, the world would just be one immense body and the hole in the wall might 
threaten to swallow up the child. As the symbolic does its work, elements of 
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reality become transformed into systems of signs, whose value depends on the 
other parts of the system, rather than on bodily equations. If too much of the body 
is present, we cannot enter a shared social space. (52)  
The construction of shared reality is linked to the way the body is received in the world. 
We imagine the ways the body becomes an expansive question for Herculine Barbin 
when, in adolescence, at each turn, her confessions and curiosities are met with silence 
and a terrible insistence for secrecy by the adult authorities with whom she shares her 
concern. The interest expressed from questions of the body cannot be “spread out and 
symbolized” when it is met with these refusals. 
The basic and relentless parental activity of inscribing “no” functions to lay down 
limits to and restructurations of bodily sensations, of what parts of the body are touchable 
before the eyes of other people, of which or how much food is edible, etc. Leader (2011) 
elaborates on the inscription of negativity: “We are told what and when to eat […] when 
to excrete and when not to, when we can and when we can’t look or listen; that we have 
to wear clothes to cover our bodies; that we can’t touch ourselves in front of other 
people”(Leader 2009). The negative inscription we find running through these stories 
helps us to think about the ways care poses a tension between reception and inscription 
that is animated in the parental formulation of response. 
Psychoanalysis places simple emphasis, if all goes well enough with the child’s 
capacity to perceive the mother as a separate being, on a shift from the mother-baby unit 
to the subject positions of mother and baby. This change entails the transition, in the 
conceptualization of Melanie Klein (1987), from perceiving the mother as a part object to 
perceiving the mother as a whole object and without being crushed by the objectivity of 
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the mother.  Development can be understood as knotting together language, law, and 
bodily sensations with an eye to timing and unobtrusive intervention to avoid premature 
separation. Imbued with the movements from mother-infant (invisible oneness) to mother 
and infant (separateness) this process allows us to have bodies, rather than be bodies 
(Ogden 1993, 173). Negative inscription is a way of offering the presence of the other 
which leads to the creation of a “potential space” as opposed to the “premature 
objectification (discovery of the mother as object) and internalization of the object 
mother,” which “lead to the establishment of an omnipotent internal object-mother” 
(Ogden 1993, 181). 
The process of the gradual inscription of negativity has implications for the 
caregiver. At first, ‘What should we do with bodies?’ appears as an urgent question for 
the caregiver. Thomas Ogden (1993) explains this concern as a psychological entity and 
compound to the extent that for Winnicott “the behaviour of the environment is part of 
the individual's own personal development and must therefore be included” (171-2). The 
complexity of care in its early form in infancy, as seen in Winnicott’s work, illustrates the 
kernel of madness we find in the collapse between conceiving of the subject as being 
body or as having a body.  Winnicott calls this ordinary early form of care “Primary 
Maternal Preoccupation,” a “condition,” he says, akin to an illness that signals the 
“experience of losing oneself in another (‘feeling herself into her infant’s place’), 
[...which] is the mother’s experience of becoming a part of the mother-infant” (Winnicott 
1956: 304 quoted in Ogden). The consequence of this constitutional experience a 
development of not “simply the study of the growth of the infantile psyche from 
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primitivity to maturity; it is also the study of the development of the mother-infant into a 
mother and infant” (Ogden 1993, 49). 
In a talk given on the subject of hypochondria Darian Leader (2009) elaborates on 
the implications of this collapse for the enabling of the function of  negative inscription: 
Anna Freud was one of the first to write about how the child manages to have a 
bod[y]. And for her the body is first and foremost the possession of the caregiver, 
usually of the mother. Even twenty, thirty years later a mother can still feel an 
insult if their child has dirty fingernails. There is a sense of ownership or 
possession of the child’s body which she must clean, take care of, love, keep safe 
all the different relations one can imagine between mother and a child which for 
Anna Freud it implied the child’s body was first of all the possession of the 
mother. And at an unconscious level, the child would register that in a certain 
sense stay with them throughout their lives. (Leader 2009) 
On one hand, it is possible to say that through negative inscriptions education, in chorus 
with various other institutions, presents experiences in which “the doldrums of 
adolescence”  (Winnicott 2012c,  124) can lead to the transition from being a body to 
having a body. On the other hand, as Tamaki Saito (2014) underscores, in the context of 
adolescent social withdrawal, education also contributes to the failure of inscriptions of 
negativity. He calls this contribution the “disavowal of castration” (173). In the 
psychoanalytic framework development involves several necessary separations. Saito 
suggests the current educational system is contributing to the failure to allow for these 
developmental separations by producing pictures of development equated with 
omnipotence. Leader (2011) explains that the disillusionment of omnipotence is essential 
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to the human’s capacity to make meaning, which as a process entails a double function. 
The process, he intimates, “introduces a negativity into our lives, establishing both 
meaning and limitation to meaning” (52). 
The questions of adolescent suffering and care arise through the inscription of 
negativity. Let’s recall some pervasive images associated with adolescent suffering: the 
truant adolescent, the rebellious adolescent, the teen parent, the homeless youth, the 
adolescent with an eating disorder, and the suicidal adolescent. Responses we find in the 
frameworks concerned with adolescent development formulate a knotting of the three 
fundamental aspects of the framework—language, law, and bodily sensations—where we 
find the frequently asked questions of the adolescent body. Education, among other 
institutional responses, when all goes well, ties the adolescent to the experience of having 
a body. 
And yet, the provision of care takes a more complicated configuration when the 
adolescent’s suffering is linked to a bodily aspect of the self.  Both in the popular 
depiction of adolescent suffering in the media, or in the medical discourse, descriptions 
of the dangers of this period of life lay great emphasis on the bodily dangers, where we 
find negative inscriptions more vividly and vocally employed. More prevalent 
inscriptions tend to be over the fear of sexuality which are accompanied by numerous 
prohibitions that simply reduce sexuality to proper behaviour, demanding compliance 
with external reality, leading, as illustrated in the case of Gavin Grimm, to the 
constitution of a “condition of war” overlooking the questions sexuality brings to 
subjectivity (Britzman 2012, 102). Care embedded in negative inscription departs from 
care as an environmental provision in a way that risks fobbing off the adolescent of his or 
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her subjectivity by the act of care itself. Adolescents are mistakenly imagined as subjects 
that are bodies as opposed to subjects who have bodies. The story we find in the memoir 
of Herculine Barbin illustrates an inability to see the embodied subject beyond the 
imaginary of the gendered body. 
5.5. Conclusion 
In Playing and Reality Winnicott (2012b) remarks on the madness of care under 
the subject of ‘confusion.’ “Another source of confusion,” he writes, “is the glib 
assumption that if mothers and fathers bring up their babies and children well there will 
be less trouble” (193). The collapse between conceiving of the adolescent as being a body 
and as having a body outlines two interrelated tensions, as Winnicott points out: the 
maternal madness of the mother’s total dedication to her infant and the madness that 
comes from care where there is no separation. In the provision of care for adolescence 
this translates as adult madness over the bodily changes and expressions of the 
adolescent, in fact what has already happened to the adult, and the madness that comes 
from care where the adult cannot separate himself from the adolescent’s situation.  
Holding this tension as integral to the struggles of how an adolescent comes to inhabit 
one’s body enables one to maintain the limit encountered in the work of care as part of 
development. Herculine and Bartleby suggest how inhabiting a body is intrinsically 
linked to the responder-in-care’s experience of inhabiting her or his own body. 
Psychosocial theories of care suggest that the question of the body poses a serious 
challenge for those involved in the work of care because “the adolescent’s own body so 
often becomes the physical site for the enactment of psychic confusion, conflict and pain” 
(Waddell 2002, 369). The site of enactment hosts a particular challenge that brings out 
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dilemmas of misunderstanding made for the adult from the distance of critical 
detachment. This dilemma refers us to some of the most difficult questions of psychical 
uncertainty that take us to “immediate, quasi-psychotic modes of mental functioning” 
such as “the concreteness; the grandiosity; the tendency towards extreme projection, self-
preoccupation and denial; the rapid shifts between paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
states of mind” (Waddell 2002, 369). The conceptual collapse of the adolescent as being 
a body and the adolescent as having a body derives from the challenges that receiving, 
representing, and responding to the difficulties of embodiment pose for the work of care, 
which includes the need, for the one working with the adolescent, as Waddell (2002) 
notes: 
to register and constantly tolerate considerable, and appropriate anxiety, for the 
dangers are often alarmingly and realistically high: is this young person going to 
commit suicide? Is he/she heading for a psychotic breakdown? Is this victim of 
abuse about to become an abuser him/herself? Am I seeing psychotic processes or 
an extreme version of ‘ordinary’ adolescence? – and so on. (369) 
Critical detachment constructed through the recourse to non-dynamic conceptions of the 
adolescent body is a prevalent way of coping with the anxiety-provoking work of 
maintaining a view of development where development is necessarily ridden with 
conflict. 
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Chapter 6: From a Dissociative Position to a Relational Practicality 
6.1. Introduction 
In 1961, Winnicott (2017) gave a lecture to the senior staff in a London County 
Council for Children’s Development. His opening statement, which points to the dangers 
of equating adolescence with a problem that must be gotten rid of, remains true today: 
There is at this present time a worldwide interest in adolescence and the problems 
of the adolescent. In almost all countries there are adolescent groups that make 
themselves evident in some way or other. Many studies of this phase of 
development are being made, and there has arisen a new literature, either of 
autobiography written by the young, or of novels that deal with the lives of 
teenage boys and girls. (187) 
Winnicott’s (1963/2012) revised version of “Struggling Through the Doldrums” included 
a question which he quickly resolved, adding an enigmatic response. The question poses 
a dilemma which I believe is far more interesting than it first appears and which is worth 
returning to here: “We may as well first ask ourselves, do adolescent boys and girls wish 
to be understood? I think the answer is no. In fact, adults should hide among themselves 
what they come to understand of adolescence” (145). In a certain way, this dissertation 
has shown why Winnicott’s warning may point to a new way of thinking relationally. 
Thoughts about adolescence do reference the conditions of our time, the primary 
one being the ascendency of medical, legal, and pedagogical frames. The context for 
which Winnicott’s formulation of the adult community’s failure to understand adolescent 
experience comments on how adolescent experience was conflated with responses to 
adolescents. “Public irritation with the phenomenon of adolescence,” Winnicott 
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(1961/2017) wrote, “can easily be evoked by cheap journalism and public 
pronouncements of persons in key positions, with adolescence referred to as a problem” 
188). Winnicott warned that the overlooked dimension of care is the dimension of the 
process that “cannot be hurried up, though indeed it can be broken into and destroyed by 
clumsy handling; or it can wither up from within when there is psychiatric illness in the 
individual” (188). 
In this dissertation I highlighted a similar tension that contemporary social 
establishments enact in terms of offering dissociative responses to adolescent experience 
through the adolescent body. The responses are dissociative in two ways: as discourse 
that either externalizes or internalizes the adolescent body. Externalizing discourse 
isolates the adolescent’s experience from the social situation they are in. Internalizing 
discourse presents an imagination wherein the adolescent experience localises the conflict 
within an asocial adolescent body. 
The discourse of internalization refers to the prevalent ways of localising the 
sorrows and stresses of adolescent experience onto conceptions of non-dynamic body 
parts unhinged from relationality. The discourse of internalization overwhelmingly 
hinges on discussions of the brain, hormones, and genetic determinants which are 
rendered particularly asocial. It is a striking quality to see the adolescent body rendered 
as something akin to a piece of hardware. As we saw in the cases of kids with severe 
social withdrawal and the case of the transgender adolescent, when adolescent experience 
is not immediately accessible to the frameworks in the work of provision of care, radical 
drifts through the discourses of externalization or internalization are provided as 
reassurance. 
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In the case of externalization, we find an automatic discourse of detachment: ‘I 
am here to help you, you are not affecting me.’ Providing care, in other words, is treated 
as an objective position but the adolescent is not. Externalization has to do with the 
caregiver’s authority, standing, and professional knowledge. Insofar as the adolescent’s 
suffering is conceived through a non-dynamic adolescent body, the adolescent appears as 
a placeholder. In the discourse of externalization, adolescent conflict has to do with 
nothing other than will, motivation, refusal, cognitive deficit, or maladjustment. 
Contrary to the prevalent splitting between externalisation and internalisation, 
psychosocial reasoning presents an alternative by looking at the question of the body 
through relationality in representations, reception, and responses to adolescent 
experience. Going back to Winnicott’s remarks on the conflation between what the 
adolescent is and what we think the adolescent is brings us back to a basic mismatch 
between the question of the origin of the body and what we think of the body as being 
integral to the question of the provision of adolescent care. 
This constitutive mismatch is present from the earliest relations between infants 
and mothers. “Although a wide range of the baby’s activities and reactions can be tracked 
and monitored”, Corfield and Leader (2008) note in their exploration of this fundamental 
mismatch, “can we ever really know for sure what the baby is feeling, even if certain 
broad categories like ‘distress’ or ‘contentment’ seem obvious?” (168). Psychosocial 
theories suggest that even before birth the body gains a communicative quality as even in 
the womb there is a relation caught up with meaning. Each bodily sign joins the 
caregiver’s struggle to make meaning. Most conspicuously in infancy, the fascinating 
communicative quality of bodily distress can be seen in how adults respond to the baby’s 
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distress without certainty of the meaning of the infant’s feelings and yet with the 
obligation to respond to the child as if they know in advance what is being asked for. 
 The defense of externalization enables an automated system of response wherein 
the provision of care is imagined to be one that “run[s] on a schedule that has nothing to 
do with the child but with a system of rules established by the parent or some published 
advice” (Corfield and Leader 2008, 169). What is missed when care is formulated 
through adequations of externalization, for psychosocial theories, is that externalization 
obliterates the interpersonal communicative quality of care. As Corfield and Leader note, 
this permeates responses of care as an idealization of the omnipotent position of the 
provision of care, which “blocks the idea that the infant’s bodily and mental states can 
affect other people” (169-70). 
The professional recourses to these splittings captured my attention for their 
resemblance with an earlier crisis in the early studies of the mother-infant relationship. 
The 1950s studies on childhood and adolescence were characterized by a central 
emphasis on the quality of the relationship between mother and children. In the studies 
that proliferated in the post-war era a large body of research documented the importance 
of relationality for development. John Bowlby (2012a, 2012b), D.W. Winnicott (2012), 
Harry Harlow (1958), Anna Freud (2015), Edward Glover (1945), and René Spitz (1983), 
among others, documented implications of relationality embedded in the bodily 
expressions of infancy, childhood, and adolescence that had received much less attention 
prior to the 1950s. 
At this time, studies on childhood and adolescence, not dissimilar to the crisis of 
today, were subject to the question of how they might be established as legitimate in 
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relation to the existing body of studies that were deemed scientific. The work that shaped 
the public imagination over the questions of care, separation, and parenting were mostly 
led by psychoanalytically informed orientations. Notably D.W. Winnicott (1994; 2012a), 
John Bowlby (2012a; 2012b), René Spitz (1983), and Dorothy Burlingham and Anna 
Freud (1954; 1943/2005) were some of the major figures involved in the transformation 
of the public imaginary around the ways in which development hinges on relationality. 
The figure of Bowlby is crucial in staging the conflict regarding relationality as he 
belonged to the generation of psychotherapists whose work aimed to establish 
psychoanalysis in the post-war era scientific community (Shapira 2013). Bowlby’s work 
after the war was particularly significant for its persuasive claims over the dire 
consequences of separation. For Bowlby “maternal care in early life is as essential for 
mental health as is correct feeding for physical well-being” (The Times 15 May 1951, 5). 
But also, Bowlby was of the opinion that current literature in clinical psychology lacked 
the scientific status to support the observations he made in his work. 
The crisis of legitimacy experienced by research on infant-mother relationality 
was solved either through animal research directly or in reference to animal research. 
Bowlby was drawn to animal research to prove what he thought the psychologists of the 
milieu failed to observe: to understand the child-and-mother relationship in its own right 
without it being spoiled by the projections of human interpretation. Notably, Harry 
Harlow’s (1958) study of “The nature of Love” was the example par-excellence that 
quickly became significant for many theories on the child-mother relationship for its 
audacity in showing the sheer consequences of separation for infant monkeys. 
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The discourse of externalization was in motion. The studies of Harlow and Lorenz 
that published claims about newly hatched goslings and infant monkeys provided Bowlby 
with a scientific base that functioned as a stabilizer for what he observed in his work with 
infants. This allowed him to draw significant and confident conclusions in his work 
carried out with children who experienced intense mental pain, misery, frustration, and 
refusals due to the separation of bereavement (Ezquerro 2016). From his dissatisfaction 
with the clinical psychological literature of his time Bowlby turned to the works of 
ethnologists and made use of their concepts (Bowlby 1958). The question is: What does it 
mean to make a case for the significance of relationality in infants’ and children's 
responses to separations by leaning upon experiments that provide reassurance generated 
by the illustration of physiology carried out on animals who clearly lack the verbal 
communicative function? What does it mean to draw from these studies that use 
something other than descriptive methods to describe the relation between mother and 
infant? 
The discourses of externalization and internalization through asocial descriptions 
of biological aspects of the adolescent body illustrate a similar attempt to solve the 
question of uncertainty embedded in human psychology and relationality. Whether it is 
brain activity, genetic background, or hormonal imbalance, each description prevents 
involvement with the question of relationality that the provision of care requires. In term 
of its physiological aspect, the body is a part of the question of care. And yet the question 
of recourses to the adolescent body as made as by  “hypotheses concerning the body’s 
physiological mechanisms” is still an unrecognized line of inquiry (Corfield and Leader 
2008, 170). 
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How we imagine the provision of adolescent care has implications for how care is 
provided. The drift into the medical approach as the chief way of understanding, 
identifying, and responding to adolescent experience, as I maintained in the chapter two, 
does not stem from some recent discovery or one that provides a biological marker 
“useful in identifying any psychiatric disorder” (Vanheule 2017, 3). The impasse in the 
case of Gavin Grimm and the child with severe withdrawal illustrate a shift in the 
discourse from the biological determinism that exemplifies the discourse of 
internalization to a discourse of human rights that does not only gesture towards a new 
kind of relationality but also signals the power of a relational adolescent body which, in 
return, points to the potential for change in the imaginary of the helping professions. 
My engagement with psychosocial case reasoning developed a reading practice to 
illustrate a new kind of relationality in adolescent development with the intention of 
constructing   a psycho-social  theory of the adolescent body. Psychosocial theories of the 
adolescent body offer an exemplary mode for understanding adolescent experience where 
the body occupies a relational place. The psychosocial turn through case reasoning with 
its emphasis on desire, transference, and relationality counters the adult splitting of the 
discourses of externalization and internalization alongside adolescent experience. 
My critique of epidemiological approaches thus opens an inquiry into the cultural 
risks made from receiving, representing, and responding to the adolescent. I suggest we 
are in need of a psychosocial turn that could maintain thinking on the constellation of the 
adolescent as a real person, a figure, and a relation (Britzman in press). Psychosocial 
reasoning allows us to engage with the relational dynamic of experience “by an affective, 
political, and ethical ‘transference’” and thus address the contested phenomenon of 
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critical detachment, which recurrently positions the difficulties of adolescence as separate 
from the adult world and as, a supposed solution hinging upon the non-relational 
imaginary around the adolescent body (Kristeva 2011, 24). 
This dissertation is an attempt to think in that direction. By looking at the 
reasoning of major trends in receiving, representing, and responding to adolescent 
subjectivity, I work to extend the exploration of what holds us back in contemporary 
settings concerned with adolescent experience. As I have shown, compartmentalisation is 
increasingly used in the best interests of adolescents to maintain an untenable social 
reality. I argue, joining Britzman (in press), that conceptualizations of crisis at the level 
of the adolescent as a figure and as a real person proffer a paradox through which we are 
able to engage with the dynamic of ‘disruptions’ in the structure of response in ways that 
are sustaining for both the work of care and that of holding together a range of 
professional communities concerned with adolescent development. 
6.2. The psychosocial body: A return to relational formulations of the body 
In this dissertation I offer a psychosocial view of the body, which acknowledges 
the question of the body as a stumbling block for those involved in the provision of care. t 
A  psychosocial view of the body argues that the sorrows and stresses of adolescent 
subjectivity involve a multi-faceted approach which cannot be reduced either to a 
discourse of externalization through an imaginary of the unaffected, omnipotent 
responder or to a discourse of internalization through an asocial imaginary of the 
adolescent body. 
While we might envision the body’s part of the developmental process as the 
purely machine-like automaton, enabling discourses of both internalization and 
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externalization, the work of providing care is still subject to the intersubjectivity of the 
adolescent and the situation of response. If we choose the brain, for example, to name the 
bodily process in the genesis of an illness, we still find a relational biology that is 
affected by changes by development, experience, or injury (Malabou 2012). Subjectivity, 
Malabou maintains, is commonly rendered purely as a machine—the brain, which is 
marked by the particularity of “individual experience, skills, and life habits, by the power 
of impression of existence in general” (Malabou 2008, 7). 
Development hinges on the fact of dependency and  protracted immaturity is the 
hallmark of subjective development. The process through which a subject comes to 
inhabit a body, therefore, always refers to another body. To play on Winnicott’s well-
known whimsical statement ‘there is no such thing as an infant’, we could say that ‘there 
is no such thing as a body,’ there are always two bodies. From the moment of its 
conception the body becomes entangled with another body and has the task of becoming 
a self. This intersubjective bodily subjectivity imposes relational questions on the 
conditions of self-other relations. From feeding in infancy and childhood, to the questions 
of self-harm in adolescence, developmental experiences are predominantly marked by 
intersubjective dimensions (Edmondson, Brennan and House 2016). 
The non-dynamic formulations of the body enable an imaginary which is 
relatively exempt from the uncertainties of subjectivity. The question of the provision of 
adolescent care is disturbed by the relational rendering of adolescent experience as it 
triggers the experience of losing control. Psychosocial case reasoning, in this sense, 
insists upon the question of the limit as integral to the provision of care in social 
establishments.  Britzman (2009) notes: 
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If we speak of development as a progression from immaturity to maturity, as a 
unifying property of the individual, and thus as capable of expression without 
conflict, we are apt to miss the fact of development as our human condition. We 
are likely to forget that all of us are subject to the radical uncertainty of being with 
others in common and uncommon history and that this being with other beings 
makes development uneven and uncertain. If we forget that development takes its 
own novel time, we are likely to become impatient with ourselves and with 
others. Yet development, too, carries its own traces of antidevelopment, areas of 
irresolvable conflict—incompleteness—that return as if it did not belong to itself, 
and to qualities of retroactive time that not only defer its meaning but provide the 
self with its new understandings of old events. (27) 
As Britzman points out, the idea of development is laced with the difficulty of holding a 
unitary view of its events, where conflict, regression, imperfection, and linearity are 
imagined to be irrelevant to the experience of development. This tendency for views of 
adolescence to drift towards fragmentation and disunity bears on the relational paradoxes 
that the doldrums of the adolescent bring to institutional settings. The view of 
development divorced from the complexity of both the experience of development and 
the work of provision will inevitably lead to the idea that adolescents are simply the 
possessors of a psychology and the task of development and that it is the adults involved 
in the provision of care who are in charge of managing the psychology and its 
developments (Britzman 2012). 
At this point I can identify two ongoing dilemmas for those who work with 
adolescents. The first has t do with the dilemma of care and the question what is it that 
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can be cared for? The issue is that we care for the relation. In the recourses to the 
adolescent body, the adult response has the challenge of sustaining a picture of conflict in 
which human subjectivity is always laced with the intersubjective dynamic of the body. 
Adults will be affected. In her brilliant work “The Role of Bodily Illness in the Mental 
Life of Children” Anna Freud (1952) made a significant observation regarding 
intersubjectivity linking the concerns of the ordinary experience of parenting and of being 
parented. Alayne Yates (1991) elaborates on Freud’s observation: 
[i]n the youngster's mind, his body belongs to his parents (usually to the mother) 
until early in adolescence. This means that children assume that their parents 
"own" their body and are responsible for its health and hygiene. She notes that 
they do with their body as they please: eating with dirty hands, stuffing 
themselves with the wrong foods, forgetting to change into pyjamas or brush their 
teeth, and so forth. Those children who wash their hands before eating (without 
being told) are uncommonly obsessional. Even when children are involved in 
activities away from the home, they continue to use the parent as their point of 
reference and they assume that the parent is responsible for their care. Even when 
they seem to be independent, their body remains in the parent's domain. (173) 
As Yates indicated, the body from infancy onwards becomes the site of transactions. In 
development the ways that the body is situated in one’s life indicates significant 
relational information as the body gradually becomes a more ambivalent site of exchange 
for the subject insofar as development itself involves a conflict between “needing the 
parent and the pressure to become more independent” (174). It is this conflict between 
dependency and independency that the body represents in the common experiences of 
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eating disorders and self-harm where the body becomes the chief site for expressing 
subjectivity. 
The second dilemma is with the concept of the limit as a problem for the 
provision of care. This is an old dilemma and it draws from the mother infant dyad that 
must signify the gap between what is going on with the infant and what the mother needs 
to do. While clearly there are actual actions there is also the mother’s imagination. What 
sustains that relationship is the ever present fantasy of care which is a hallmark of that 
relationship and involves a great deal of belief in development. Leader and Corfield 
(2008) delve into this belief: 
If, for example, jiggling a feeding baby produces a temporary halt in sucking, and 
stopping jiggling generates a burst of sucking, we might be observing a rhythm, 
but does this have the dignity of human dialogue? But the key here is precisely 
the fact that, even if these cycles are not a dialogue, the mother behaves as if they 
are. It is this belief that will help introduce the infant into the world of human 
interaction and, later, verbal dialogue. It will be an essential condition of human 
subjectivity. (169) 
Here, my shift to belief is meant to go beyond Kristeva’s syndrome of ideality to her 
discussion on the “psychological profile of a question”(Kristeva 1995, 88).  In her study 
on the profile of a question, Kristeva describes a psychosocial position which she 
describes as the “questioning and questioned subjects” as opposed to “subjects-presumed 
to know” (89): 
Though analytic interpretation adopts neither the melodic patterns nor the 
syntactic features of a question, it adopts the psychological profile of a question. I 
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think I know something, but I give up and allow you to speak. You are the one 
who must know, speak lie, think. By giving a name to that which cannot be 
formulated, I put it into question. I make an affect into a question, I elevate 
sensation to the understanding of a sign; I introduce a secret trauma into an 
allocution. By formulating a question for the analyst, sensations or affects that are 
impossible to formulate can make sense to the patient. They can be articulated, 
displaced, or developed. Analytic name-giving is not a definition, for it is content 
to repudiate the repudiatio[n]. (89) 
These methodological and theoretical dilemmas have profound implications for a new 
reading of the adolescent as the adolescent appears as a figure in the literature, as a 
person who lives and suffers in institutional frameworks, and as capable of thinking 
differently about the adolescent situations found in institutional frameworks. My 
discussion grapples with this moment of institutional development where the handling of 
adolescent experience has been entangled with debates over the adolescent’s own 
transitions. 
A psychosocial approach turns to the vacillations in adult-adolescent relationships 
and sees a dilemma for thought over and above mastering the meaning of adolescent 
development and the tantalizing promises of cures and developmental achievement. Such 
a turn distinguishes influence from imposition, anticipation from retrospection, and 
efficacy from the literalization of symptoms. This claim echoes Britzman’s (2003) 
argument that the conflict experienced in clinical practise over the question of how 
adolescent suffering is being imagined can be found in practice within a larger scope of 
questions that are left unthought. Ideas about the nature of conflict and adolescent 
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experience are indissociable from the construction of predictions made from the 
“strangely singular encounter of the analytic session, meandering through the 
transference and countertransference” (46). 
Psychoanalysis envisions adolescence as inseparable from childhood and 
adulthood and thus treats adolescent problems as inextricable from those of adults. An 
area of interest includes wondering more about how impositions of facts made from the 
questions of fantasy and frustration cling to certainty and shelter behaviourism. 
Moreover, given that psychoanalysis links the fear of being influenced to ideality, its 
approach begins from the felt anxieties that emanate from uncertainty. 
Those working with adolescents and those who are adolescents themselves both 
feel experience as disruptive. Given this radical relationality, here thought through the 
transference and counter-transference within a framework of case reasoning, professional 
provisions have to rethink the affected grounds of their prescriptions. The psychosocial 
turn through case reasoning suggests that the difficulty of working with and responding 
to the disturbance in adolescence requires a shift in thinking about transition, 
transformation, and development not yet unhinged from the phantasies embedded and 
persistent within institutional frameworks. Attention to the emotional situation of 
adolescence offers a means of sustaining the paradox of suffering in order not to 
foreclose the questions that symptoms present and render inarticulate. That is, we can 
think about adolescent experience as an enigmatic signifier imbued with conscious and 
unconscious expressions that resist being reduced in order to be understood. 
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